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V I
STAKEHOLDER AND INDUSTRY EFFECTS ON THE LEVEL
OF SEGMENT REPORTING
I . INTRODUCTION
1.1 Discussion of the research problem
Current segment reporting requirements (Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standard No. 14)(SPAS 14) allow 
management a large degree of latitude in determining the 
segments reported (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
1976) . This flexibility may allow firms to underreport the 
results of operations.
Underreporting information prevents investors from 
efficiently allocating resources. Financial statement user 
groups, such as the Association for Investment Management 
and Research (AIMR) and the Financial Analysts Federation, 
have stated that segment disclosure is important to them in 
their analyses of firms and they are concerned about its 
adequacy (AIMR, 1991 and Pacter, 1993). Two of the primary 
concerns are that firms do not disaggregate enough to report 
results for each line of business in which they are engaged 
and that the reporting levels are inconsistent both across 
firms and across time within firms. In response to segment 
reporting criticism, regulators are in the process of 
reevaluating disaggregated disclosure regulation (American 
Accounting Association's Financial Accounting Standards 
Committee, 1994).
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The concern of underreporting suggests that financial 
statement users have an expectation of a given firm's level 
of segment reporting. This study addresses the 
underreporting concern by developing a measure that captures 
a firm's level of segment reporting relative to a reasonable 
expectation for segment reporting given the firm's 
operations. The concern of inconsistency in segment 
reporting levels across firms is addressed by identifying 
stakeholder relations and industry factors affecting firms' 
chosen levels of segment reporting.
Prior segment reporting research is extended in 
primarily two areas. One area is in the analysis of current 
segment reporting practices. Past criticisms of 
underreporting in segment reporting have not been quantified 
in terms of what was expected to be reported. In this 
study, I develop a measure of the level of segment reporting 
that models the number of segments reported as a percentage 
of the possible number as determined by the number of 
industries in which the company operates. This allows a 
segment reporting profile to be developed based on the 
sample firms. Results revealed that many firms do not 
identify as many segments for reporting as they have lines 
of business. However, most firms' disaggregate at least 
along broad industry lines. Many firms disaggregate more 
than the minimum indicated by the number of lines of 
business.
Segment reporting research is also extended by applying 
disclosure theory to segment reporting to address the issue 
of inconsistencies in reporting across firms. Even though 
segment reporting is mandated, the flexibility afforded in 
SFAS 14 allows segment reporting to resemble a discretionary 
disclosure. The basic premise underlying disclosure theory 
is that managers face a trade-off between providing 
financial reports that help capital markets value the firm 
accurately and withholding information to maximize the 
firm's product market advantage (Healy and Palepu, 1993) . 
Harris (1994) addressed the effect of competition on 
segments identified for reporting. This study extends 
Harris' study by examining effect of stakeholder 
relationships, such as investors, creditors, managers and 
employees, and industry membership effects on segment 
reporting decisions. In brief, results show that dependence 
on the external capital market is positively associated with 
segment reporting levels. Additionally, industry 
membership, encompassing both herding behaviors and 
barriers-to-entry effects, are significantly associated with 
segment reporting levels.
This study is especially timely due to the FASB's 
current réévaluation of segment reporting requirements. The 
results of this study will aid regulators in determining the 
adequacy of current regulation. A current profile of 
segment reporting levels as well as factors affecting
segment reporting decisions will provide useful information 
to both standard setters and financial statement users.
1.2 Description of segment reporting requirements
As stated in Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 
No. 14 (SFAS 14), paragraph 5, the purpose of the segment 
reporting requirement is to assist financial statement users 
in analyzing and understanding the enterprise's financial 
statements by permitting better assessment of the 
enterprise's past performance and future prospects. The 
reporting requirements are not intended to allow for perfect 
comparability between similar segments of various 
enterprises. Managers have discretion in identifying 
appropriate segments to be reported, identifying assets for 
each segment and in allocating shared costs across segments 
to calculate segment operating income.
SFAS 14 offers guidance in determining reportable 
segments. The determination of an enterprise's industry 
segments must depend to a considerable extent on the 
judgment of the management of the enterprise.
According to SFAS 14, three main factors should be 
considered in determining whether products and services are 
related :
a. The nature of the product--related products and 
services would have similar purposes or uses and would be 
expected to have similar rates of profitability, similar
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degrees of risk and similar opportunities for growth.
b. The nature of the production process--sharing of 
common production facilities, equipment and labor force and 
use of the same or similar raw materials may indicate that 
products are related.
c. Markets and marketing methods--how the product is 
marketed and the nature of the customers indicate the degree 
of relationship between products and services. For example, 
two products marketed by the same sales force to a common 
customer base may indicate related products. Additionally, 
the sensitivity of the market to price changes and other 
economic variables may indicate the degree of relatedness.
An identified segment is only considered to be 
significant, and therefore reportable, if it meets one of 
the following:
a) the segment's revenue is 10 percent or more of the 
combined revenue of the enterprise.
b) the absolute amount of the segment's operating 
profit or loss is 10 percent or more of the combined profit 
of all segments that did not incur an operating loss or the 
combined operating loss of all segments that did incur an 
operating loss, or
c) the segment's identifiable assets are 10 percent or 
more of the combined identifiable assets of all industry 
segments.
Once the company has identified the reportable
segments, the following information must be provided for 
each segment, either in the footnotes, body of the financial 
statements or in supplementary schedules :
Sales
Operating income
Depreciation, amortization or depletion
Capital Expenditures
Identifiable assets
Once the company has identified segments as reportable, 
the combined revenue from sales to unaffiliated customers of 
all reportable segments must constitute 75% of the combined 
revenue from unaffiliated customers of all firm operations. 
If segments identified to be reportable do not meet the 75% 
test, additional segments must be identified for reporting 
until the 75% test is met. In practice, it has been noted 
that segment data usually constitutes all the operations of 
a firm with insignificant operations apparently being 
combined with each other or other more significant 
operations.
Other disaggregated reporting are required, which are 
not within the scope of this study. Major customers, 
constituting 10% or more of a firm's sales, are required to 
be identified. Additionally, foreign and domestic 
operations are required to be broken out by broad geographic 
areas. Exports to any one foreign country in excess of 10% 
of total firm sales are required to be disclosed.
The SEC segment reporting requirements require firms to 
report sales to unaffiliated customers, transfers to other
segments, operating profit and identifiable assets for each 
reportable segment. If generally accepted accounting 
principles have been followed in preparing this information 
for the annual report, the firm can merely reference the 
annual report in their lOK report.
1.3 Summary
Managers have discretion in identifying segments to be 
reported, identifying assets associated with each segment 
and in allocating shared costs across segments to calculate 
segment operating profit. This study examines stakeholder 
and industry factors that may influence the chosen level of 
segment reporting. Associations found between segment 
reporting strategy and stakeholder relationships and 
industry characteristics provide additional insights into 
segment reporting choices and should be of value in 
formulating future reporting policy.
The remainder of this proposal is organized as follows. 
Section II discusses the motivations for segment reporting 
research and a review of the segment reporting literature. 
Section III discusses applies disclosure theory to segment 
reporting and develops hypotheses. Section IV contains the 
results of the data analyses for both the profile of segment 
reporting and explanatory models estimated for segment 
reporting levels. Section V summarizes the study and 
provides potential contributions of the research.
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II. MOTIVATION AND PRIOR RESEARCH
Several financial reporting constituencies have been 
involved in the ongoing study and critique of segment 
reporting. These constituencies have included financial 
analysts, accounting practitioners, corporate managers, 
academic researchers and policy makers. This chapter 
provides some historical background and reviews the 
literature surrounding segment reporting from both the 
practitioner and academic research perspective.
2.1 Historical Background of Segment Reporting
In 1964, the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee's 
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly held hearings 
regarding the economic concentration in American industry, 
particularly the conglomerate (diversified) form of 
business. Debate ensued among academicians, members of 
Congress, SEC officials, financial analysts, executives and 
accounting practitioners regarding the propriety of 
financial reporting for segments of a business enterprise. 
Segment reporting was controversial because it was counter 
to the idea that consolidated financial statements fairly 
present the financial position and operating results of a 
business.
APB Statement No. 2, "Disclosure of Supplemental
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Financial Information by Diversified Companies," was issued 
in 1967 recommending voluntary disclosure of segment 
information. The SEC required line-of-business reporting in 
registration statements of new stock issues in 1969. In 
1970, the SEC extended line-of-business reporting to Form 
10-K, the report filed annually by all publicly held 
companies. In 1973, the New York Stock Exchange urged 
companies to include line-of-business reporting in the 
annual reports.
The FASB proceeded with formulation of segment 
reporting requirements responding to SEC actions and 
extensive research performed by the National Association of 
Accountants and the Financial Executives Institute (Backer 
and McFarland 1968, Mautz 1968) . The FASB discussion 
memorandum, "An Analysis of Issues Related to Financial 
Reporting for Segments of a Business Enterprise," cited two 
points that were the bases for proponents of segment 
reporting: 1) various types of operations may have
differing prospects for growth, rates of profitability, and 
degrees of risk, and 2) since management responsibility is 
frequently decentralized, the assessment of management 
ability requires less than total enterprise information.
FASB Statement No. 14, "Financial Reporting for 
Segments of a Business Enterprise (SFAS 14),'' was issued in 
December of 1976. SFAS 14 has had minor amendments, but 
remains the standard for disclosure of industry segments.
2.2 Discussion of Literature from the Practice Perspective
Changes are currently underway in the way business 
segments will be reported. Both the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) and the Canadian Accounting Standards 
Board (CASB) are in the midst of a joint project to improve 
their respective nation's segment reporting standards. 
Additionally, the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (lASC) has issued a draft of proposed changes in 
segment reporting (McConnell and Pacter, 1995). An exposure 
draft was released by the FASB in early 1996.
Revisiting segment reporting by the standard setting 
bodies is in response to years of concerns expressed by 
various groups representing financial statement users such 
as the Association for Investment Management and Research 
(AIMR) and the Financial Analysts Federation (FAF). The FAF 
annually confers awards upon companies with superior 
financial reporting. As early as 1984, the FAF became so 
incensed by the perceived deficiencies in segment reporting, 
they refused to award companies that did not do an 
"outstanding job" with segment reporting (Journal, 1984).
Specific suggestions for segment reporting by members 
of the FAF included: 1) be uniform in the way information
is presented in each segment, 2) include segment sales and 
earnings graphs going back at least five years, 3) summarize 
the year's highlights and offer perspective on unusual 
events, 4) emphasize market size and growth rates or end 
users served by each segment and the backlog of key product 
lines and 5) break out foreign revenues, including export
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They stated that analysts believe that segment reporting by 
lines of business and geographic market is essential to 
grasp the prospects of a firm.
The AIMR has two subcommittees that are concerned with 
financial reporting. Deficiencies in segment reporting have 
been observed by these groups annually for the past 20 
years. In 1989, the AIMR surveyed the members of the FAF. 
60% of the analysts agreed that many firms have "abused the 
latitude they have been given and created reporting segments 
which have little informational content".' Over 80% agreed 
that quarterly and annual segment disclosures should include 
a discussion of the criteria management used to determine 
the business segment definition. In 1993, the AIMR 
published a position paper, "Financial Reporting in the 
1990's and Beyond". The following quote clearly outlines 
the importance of segment reporting to financial statement 
users :
It is vital, essential, fundamental, indispensable, and 
integral to the investment analysis process. Analysts 
need to know and understand how the various components 
of a multifaceted enterprise behave economically. One 
weak member of the group is analogous to a section of 
blight on a piece of fruit; it has the potential to 
spread rot over the entirety. Even in the absence of 
weakness, different segments will generate dissimilar 
streams of cash flows to which are attached disparate 
risks and which bring about unique value. Thus, 
without disaggregation, there is no sensible way to 
predict the overall amounts, timing, or risks of a
sales by a segment.
Extracted from the "Results of the Survey of FAF 
Members and Information About Ongoing Research".
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complete enterprise's future cash flows. There is 
little dispute over the analytic usefulness of 
disaggregated financial data.
The FASB became aware of concerns such as the ones 
discussed above and issued a research report in 1993 (Pacter 
1993) and an invitation to comment on business disclosures. 
The report noted that too many companies use broad 
definitions of industry to argue that they only operate in 
one line of business. Out of 6,935 public companies, 75% 
said they operated in one line of business in 1985-1991 
period. Of the 1,051 largest companies, 43% had no 
disaggregated segments reported. Other criticisms listed in 
the report included the lack of meaningful geographic 
information, the absence of evidence that segment reporting 
follows the organizational units in which the company is 
managed, and the abundance of changes in segment definition 
from period to period.
The AICPA Special Committee on Financial Reporting 
published the results of its research in November, 1993 (The 
Jenkins Report). The report reflects the findings of the 
committee's study of the information needs of the users of 
financial reports; users being investors, creditors and 
their advisors (AICPA, 1993) . The committee utilized 
various research techniques, including the study of prior 
studies and in-depth discussions with representatives of the 
various user groups. Among the highlights of the findings 
of the committee was a discussion of segment disclosures.
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The committee found that both investors and creditors place 
a high value on segment reporting and believe that current 
disaggregated disclosures generally do not provide adequate 
information to help them predict an entity's future earnings 
and cash flows. The primary recommendation to improve 
segment reporting was to put reported segments more in 
alignment with information that is reported internally to 
senior management or the board of directors. Users also 
want segment data with quarterly reporting.
The American Accounting Association's Financial 
Accounting Standards Committee (The Committee) published a 
response to the FASB Discussion Memorandum 'Reporting 
Disaggregated Information by Business Enterprises' (American 
Accounting Association, 1994). The Committee stated that 
they do not believe current segment reporting standards to 
be adequate for primarily two reasons: 1) The current 
criteria for identifying reportable segments is too vague 
and general and 2) there appears to be a lack of consistency 
in how firms define reportable segments across time. The 
Committee recommended that firms report by internal 
operating units. Auditors could determine that the segment 
reporting matches the way the firm is organized and that the 
reporting is adequate by referring to the firm's 
organizational chart. While this would result in less 
comparability across segments and firms by industry, it 
would result in more consistency in reporting by individual
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firms. The Committee further recommended that more 
information be provided by segment such as quick assets, 
current assets, current liabilities, long-term liabilities, 
cost of goods sold, gross margin and operating cash flow. 
They cite Ou and Penman (1989) in recommending the expanded 
reporting due to the evidence that these items are useful in 
predicting future earnings increases and decreases.
Not all commentaries have agreed with the AICPA and AAA 
committees regarding segment definition. Wanda Wallace 
(1994) offered a perspective that is counter to enhancing 
segment reporting by running segments along internal 
reporting mechanisms. She stated that it would be naive to 
think that reporting along the same divisions as internal 
management would provide more useful information. An 
example cited was that a company that managed its operations 
geographically would not report any information by industry. 
Her conclusion was that stricter interpretation and 
application of the existing segment reporting standard would 
provide the most useful information.
The common thread running through the user concerns and 
recommendations is that more detailed information and more 
information items reported by segment are desirable. The 
recommendations from the users' perspectives may ignore 
reporting objectives by firms, such as limiting information 
available to competitors. The firm perspective was raised 
in a panel discussion of the Jenkins Report sponsored by the
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CPA Journal (CPA Journal, 1995). One member of the panel 
noted that lenders were not that concerned with quarterly 
segment reporting as they are interested in the debt service 
ability of the legal entity as a whole. Another member of 
the panel noted that a member of the Financial Executives 
Institute applied the suggestions of the Jenkins Report to 
his own company's financial statements and found that each 
segment would require 61 pages in the annual report. This 
particular firm had five segments which would result in over 
300 pages of financial data. Clearly, there are trade-offs 
in determining the appropriate level of disclosure.
2.3 Prior segment reporting research
Segment reporting research was active in the 1970's and 
early 1980's. The mid-1990's have seen a renewed interest 
in segment reporting. Most segment reporting studies can be 
characterized as one of two basic types : 1) those that 
examine the quality of segment operating income and the 
effect of segment data on earnings prediction and stock 
returns, and 2) those that examine the costs of segmental 
disclosures.
The quality of segment operating income and the effect of
segment data on earnings prediciton and stock returns
The ability of segment reporting to improve earnings 
prediction has been studied alone and as a step toward 
market decisions. Kinney (1971) and Collins (1976) were
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both earnings forecast model driven. Both studies found 
that segment data was useful in predicting future earnings 
of a firm. Kinney employed four models to predict the 
consolidated earnings of each sample firm for the subsequent 
year using voluntary segment data provided for years 1967 
and 1968. Two of the models used consolidated income 
statement data, one model used segment sales and the final 
model used segment sales and segment earnings. The segment 
data models had better predictive power than the models with 
consolidated data. However, he noted that segment earnings 
did not add predictive power above segment sales alone. 
Collins (1976) confirmed Kinney's findings with an extension 
utilizing more models and a larger sample. Collins noted 
that segment earnings only offered nominal improvement in 
predictive power when coupled with segment sales than did 
segment sales alone. This suggests that arbitrary 
allocation of joint costs may limit the reliability and 
predictive usefulness of segment profitability data (Collins 
1976) .
The effect of cost allocations on reported segment 
earnings and/or returns has been examined by some studies. 
Recently, Givoly, Hayn and D'Souza (1995) (GHD) arrived at a 
similar conclusion to that of Collins'. GHD developed a 
measure of segment reporting quality utilizing the 
correlation of segments' performance measures (ie., sales, 
operating profit) with their respective industries'
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performance measures. GHD found that the performance 
variables of multi-segment firms were less correlated with 
industry averages than stand-alone firms. Additionally, 
sales was found to be of higher quality than operating 
profit. An external validation of their quality measure 
found that stock returns were positively related to the 
quality measure.
Sannella (1987) proposed that since neither the amount 
of common cost allocated nor the allocation method is 
disclosed in segment reporting, management could use this 
flexibility in reporting standards to signal cash flow 
expectations through the choice of cost allocations. The 
model is set up such that if the segment's ability to bear, 
ie., segment profit before common cost allocation, is 
assumed to be held constant, and next period's cash flows 
are expected to be higher, then more common costs should be 
allocated to the high risk division. Conversely, if lower 
cash flows are expected, then more costs should be allocated 
to the segment with lower risk. The rationale is that when 
higher cash flows are expected, allocating more common costs 
to the high risk division will lower that segment's reported 
profit. Discounting the lower profit of the high risk 
division by a larger discount factor and discounting the 
increased profit of the low risk firm by a lower discount 
factor sums to an increase in the perceived value of the 
firm, which is consistent with the managers' expected cash
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flow increase. Sanella tested the hypothesis that his model 
was a driver in cost allocations used in segment reporting. 
Using firm data gathered from Compustat for the period 1975- 
1980 and utilizing allocation methods reported to the 
Federal Trade Commission for years 1975-1976 and industry 
Beta's from Value-line as a measure of segment risk.
Although his results were not statistically significant, he 
did conclude there was support for the hypothesis that a 
risk determined cost allocation method was used across 
firms, on average. He purports that the signaling 
implication provides additional support for the usefulness 
of segment reporting. Some studies focused on the relation 
between segment disclosures and security returns directly as 
opposed to the relation via segment earnings or cost 
allocations. Horwitz and Kolodny (1980) were unable to 
identify a difference in the pattern of return residuals 
between a group of firms that disclosed segment information 
for the first time and a group of single segment firms. 
Horwitz and Kolodny may have had a methodological problem 
due to trying to compare diversified firms (in the segment 
disclosure group) with single segment firms. Ajinkya (1980) 
improved on the design by comparing first time segment 
reporting firms with a control group of pre-requirement 
segment reporters. Ajinkya also failed to observe any 
difference in the risk-adjusted returns between the groups.
Swaminathan (1991) hypothesized that the disclosure of
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segment data would provide a more precise information signal 
about firm value to investors. His results revealed an 
increased price variability for firms disclosing segment 
information, which did not support the hypothesis. Aitken, 
Czernkowski and Hooper (1994) performed a study of 
Australian segment disclosures. They hypothesized that 
segment disclosures provide investors with improved ability 
to predict earnings, which means the abnormal returns 
associated with unexpected earnings should be less for 
segment reporters. They found support for improved earnings 
predictability.
The costs of segmental disclosures
The "cost" of segment reporting is generally assumed to
mean the cost to the firm in competitive advantage if 
proprietary information is revealed. Additionally, cost 
also includes the resources required to comply with 
regulation. Most cost related segment reporting research 
has been analytical with fewer studies of an empirical 
nature addressing this issue. Studying the costs associated 
with segment reporting is an attempt to view segment 
reporting from the perspective of management. One stream of 
analytical research (see, for example, Wagnehofer 1990,
Hayes and Lundholm 1992, and Ronen and Livnat 1981) has 
addressed the bundling of segment data based on the level of 
competition in the industry and/or performance of the
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segment relative to the industry. The general result has 
been that firms operating in highly competitive industries 
will tend to disclose less. This reduces the possibility of 
a competitor action resulting from the receipt of the firm's 
information. Hayes and Lundholm go further with an analysis 
of a pre-entry situation where the right information could 
prevent an entry, reducing competition. In this case, firms 
earning high levels of profits have incentives to 
distinguish themselves.
Harris (1994) was the first empirical study to apply 
disclosure theory to the segment reporting issue. She 
empirically tested the impact that competition-based 
disclosure theories have on segment reporting. Her study 
examined the impact the level of competition in a firm's 
industry has on its segment reporting decisions. She 
developed a measure of the degree of competition based on 
the persistence of return on assets in excess of the mean 
return on assets for the industry. Surprisingly, the 
likelihood of segment reporting increased as within-industry 
competition increased. This is consistent with the notion 
that firms would seek to protect profits in noncompetitive 
industries and would have lower disclosure costs in 
competitive industries. Further, she noted that firms with 
operations in industries with wide ranges of price to 
earnings ratios and wide ranges in the levels of earnings 
persistence were less likely to provide segment reporting.
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If price to earnings ratios reveal growth opportunities, 
then apparently the costs of revealing the information to 
competitors exceeds the benefits of disclosing the 
information to investors.
Additionally, she examined newly reported segments and 
segments that were no longer reported separately, 
controlling for acquisitions, divestitures and 
discontinuances of operations. The evidence from examining 
newly reported segments and segments that were no longer 
reported separately revealed additional utilization of the 
flexibility of SFAS 14. Existing segments for which 
disclosure was halted predominantly performed significantly 
worse than other segments in the industry and the remainder 
of their own firm. Additionally, when segments reported 
decreased due to redefinition of business segments, 
variability in segment return on assets decreased across the 
firm. However, the results from examining newly disclosed 
segments did not support the claim that managers fear a 
negative reaction to early losses in new ventures. Newly 
disclosed segments tended to report a positive return on 
assets, but it was lower than both the firm and the industry 
average.
Harris extended prior research in the ability of 
segment data to improve earnings forecasts or explain firm 
value. Harris contended that the inability of segment 
profits to improve earnings forecasts may have been due to
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the fact that segment profits would only be informative if 
segment profits exhibited varying levels of persistence 
across a firm. However, partitioning firms based on the 
across firm variation in segment profit persistence still 
did not improve earnings forecasts. Additionally, firm-wide 
profits explained more of the cross-sectional differences in 
market value than segment profits. This led Harris to 
conclude that the strategic manner in which segments are 
defined, as noted in the first part of her study, may reduce 
the usefulness of segment data.
2.4 Implications for future research
Harris (1994) is the first empirical study to have 
considered segment reporting as a management decision. Her 
focus was the impact of competition on the definition of 
segments reported. Acknowledgment that segment reporting, 
while mandated, allows for flexibility in interpretation to 
the extent that it shares characteristics with voluntary 
disclosures broadens the research perspective. Disclosure 
theory regarding competition was applied in the Harris 
(1994) study. A broader application of disclosure theory 
may prove useful in understanding the strategies employed by 
firms in determining their level of segment reporting. As 
discussed previously, users have been critical of the 
current state of segment reporting, resulting in FASB 
considering regulatory changes.
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Additional research as to what segment data firms are 
providing versus what segment data firms could be providing 
may prove useful in documenting the actual current state of 
segment reporting. From the user perspective, criticism has 
been aimed at deficiencies in the level of segment 
reporting. Close examination of individual firms would be 
necessary to know that deficiencies exist. Disclosure 
theory suggests that with or without regulation, firms can 
be motivated to provide a great deal of financial disclosure 
(for example, see Healy and Palepu 1993, Prankel, McNichols 
and Wilson 1995, and Ronen and Livnat, 1981.) Additional 
research applying disclosure theory to firm segment 
reporting level decisions would be revealing to policy 
makers as well as users of financial reporting. From the 
policy making perspective, more knowledge of firm segment 
reporting motivations may improve the drafting of 
regulation. In theory, regulations are successful when they 
encourage firms to provide appropriate levels of useful 
(ie., informative) disclosure rather than a prescribed level 
of disclosure with varying degrees of usefulness (Hopkins, 
1996) .
The research in this dissertation falls into the 
category of examining the "cost" of segment disclosures.
Disclosures require an analysis of the trade-off between 
benefits derived by providing data desired by the capital 
market and potential costs to firm value from an information
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transfer to competitors (Healy and Palepu, 1993). This 
study examines factors that affect the various disclosure 
costs as perceived by the firm. Reducing the cost of 
capital is an example of an effect that reduces the cost of 
disclosure. Policy makers will benefit from evidence 
revealed by this study regarding current segment reporting 
practices and firm motivations behind the segment reporting 
disclosure decisions.
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III. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
3.1 Level of segment reporting
SFAS 14 constrains the individual lines of business 
reported to ten, citing the cognitive overload that could be 
created by more. Very few firms, however, report the 
maximum ten segments, which indicates that the constraint 
imposed by regulation is not preventing firms from 
adequately disaggregating.'
Theory suggests that a firm's level of financial 
disclosure could be affected by stakeholder relationships 
(for example, see Kim 1993, Healy and Palepu 1993, Diamond 
1985, Fishman and Hagerty 1989, Diamond and Verrechia 1991, 
Ronen and Livnat 1981, Bowen DuCharme and Shores 1995) . In 
general, it is thought that disclosure decisions involve 
weighing the trade-off between providing financial reporting 
that enables the capital market to value the firm and 
withholding information to maximize the firm's product 
market advantage. Segment reporting particularly lends 
itself to this. Critics of segment reporting requirements 
cited the costs associated with revealing line of business 
information to competitors. Ceteris paribus, managers would 
prefer to reveal as little information as possible.
No sample firms reported 10 segments. The maximum 
number of segments reported is six. The mean number of 
segments reported is 1.79.
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Reliance on the capital market, or external stakeholders, 
pulls the firm toward more disclosure. Ongoing 
relationships with stakeholders, such as stockholders, 
debtholders, managers, customers and employees, create 
varying incentives for firms to manage their financial 
disclosure, which includes segment reporting. Different 
industries indicate different operating environments that 
are expected to affect the stakeholder/disclosure relation.
The following discussion and development of hypotheses 
includes three sections delineating the types of factors 
expected to affect segment reporting. These major 
categories are relationships with investors, managers and 
lenders, relationships with employees and industry 
membership.
3.1,1 Segment reporting levels and investors, managers and 
lenders
Healy and Palepu (1993) summarize the key ideas of 
accounting information models. Financial reporting will 
always be an imperfect process as long as three conditions 
are present: 1) managers have superior information about
the firm relative to investors, 2) managers incentives are 
not aligned with shareholders and 3) accounting and 
auditing rules are imperfect. These three conditions are 
expected to exist in practice. Managers are hired because 
of their superior information regarding the management of a
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particular fiirm and that makes financial reporting 
potentially informative to shareholders and potential 
investors. Conflicts of interests between managers and 
shareholders and imperfect accounting rules and auditing can 
cause distortions in the information disclosed.
As mentioned before, a dependence on the external 
capital market is positively associated with the level of 
segment reporting. Below are discussions of proxies for 
reliance on the capital market and the motivation provided 
for selection of segment reporting strategy.
Capital Market Financing
If the firm is dependent on the capital market for 
financing, or prefers public financing, then the cost of 
capital can be lowered through a more efficient stock price. 
An efficient stock price as used by Fishman and Hagerty 
(1989) refers to a stock price that is an unbiased estimate 
of future firm value. Fishman and Hagerty (1989) model 
disclosure cost on both ends of the information chain.
There is a cost to disclosure for the firm, but there is 
also a cost to a trader to analyze a firm's disclosures.
All things being equal, the more informative the disclosure 
of a given firm, the more profitable it is for a trader to 
study the disclosure and trade on the information. So firms 
are in competition for attention from traders. More 
informative disclosures can attract traders away from other
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firms elevating the given firm's market value. This results 
in a lower cost of capital and benefits stockholders. 
Fisherman and Hagerty's result reinforces the notion that 
mandatory disclosure policies are a waste of resources as 
firms have an incentive to provide the appropriate level of 
disclosure. This leads to the following hypothesis in the 
alternative form:
H, : The level of segment reporting disclosed by a firm
is positively associated with the level of 
reliance on the external capital market.
Past firm reliance on the external capital market will be 
operationalized as two measures: 1) the ratio of all bonds
and other forms of market-based debt to total assets (BONDS) 
and 2) the percentage of stock outstanding held by officers 
and directors (DIRSTK). BONDS is expected to have a 
positive association with the level of segment reporting. 
DIRSTK is expected to have a negative association with the 
level of segment reporting as higher percentages of stock 
held by officers and directors indicates less reliance on 
raising equity capital from external investors.
The proxies used above are indicative of past reliance 
on the market for financing. A potential future need to 
raise capital or secure financing may provide an incentive 
for increased disclosure or higher levels of segment 
reporting. A logical proxy for this potential future need 
for capital is a firm's level of growth. Growth is defined
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here as the five-year average annual increase in sales for 
years 1991 through 1995 (GROWTH). GROWTH is expected to 
have a positive association with the level of segment 
reporting.
Management stock ownership
The improvement in stock price efficiency shown to 
result from increased financial disclosure impacts 
shareholders positively (Fishman and Hagerty, 1989).
Managers benefit as the improved opportunities should lead 
to improved firm operating performance which reflects on 
them and would positively impact their compensation and 
future employment prospects. Managers could also directly 
benefit from higher stock prices when a portion of their 
compensation is tied to stock or they have substantial 
personal wealth invested in firm stock. Incentives could 
exist for managers to favor higher levels of financial 
disclosure separate from the cost of capital and shareholder 
welfare issues. The following hypothesis is proposed:
H^ : : The level of segment reporting disclosed by a firm
is positively associated with the proportion of 
stock-based executive compensation to total 
executive compensation.
The stock option component of executive compensation will be 
operationalized as the value of stock-based compensation 
relative to the total executive compensation for the top
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five executives as reported in the proxy statement (EXCOMP). 
EXCOMP is expected to be positively associated with the 
level of segment reporting.
It has been hypothesized that a reliance on the 
external capital market is positively associated with the 
level of segment reporting. However, managers may deem the 
cost of increasing disclosure too great as better informed 
investors also means better informed competitors, 
particularly in the case of segment reporting. Managers may 
seek other forms of communication with investors such as 
those discussed below.
Dividends and stock repurchases
Past research has shown that investors interpret 
dividend increases and stock repurchases as signals of 
managers' confidence in the quality of current and future 
earnings (Asquith and Mullins 1983, Healy and Palepu 1989, 
and Healy and Palepu 1993) . However, there is still a cost 
trade-off to be analyzed. Paying out dividends instead of 
providing more disclosure may protect valuable proprietary 
information, but the dividends are reducing the pool of 
funds available for investment. Cash payout can be a 
response to firm undervaluation if the cost of increased 
disclosure is more than the cash payout. With this 
reasoning, the following hypothesis is proposed:
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H,.: The level of segment reporting is negatively-
associated with dividend increases and stock 
repurchases.
Dividend increases (DIVING) are operationalized as a dummy 
variable when the dividends per share have increased over 
the past four years since 1991. In the past, dividends have 
been shown to be highly correlated with growth and risk 
(Beaver, Kettler and Scholes 1970). In this study, dividend 
policy is expressed as increases and were not found to be 
correlated with market beta, used as a proxy for risk. 
Therefore, it was deemed unnecessary to control for risk in 
the model. Stock repurchases (STKREP) are operationalized 
as the amount expended on stock repurchases relative to 
total assets. It has been noted when working with the 
sample data that stock repurchases tend to be the norm 
rather than the exception, however many of the repurchases 
are insignificant amounts. Therefore, it is more 
appropriate to examine the magnitude of stock repurchases as 
a means of communication with the market.
Private debt
It was mentioned above that uninformative or noisy 
financial disclosure negatively affects a firm's cost of 
capital. If increasing the level of public disclosure is 
undesirable (e.g. provides valuable information to a 
competitor), the firm can turn to private forms of
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financing. It is easier for private debtholders to obtain 
confidential information to provide the necessary financing, 
thus lowering the firm's cost of capital without having to 
make costly financial disclosures (Myers and Majluf 1984). 
Larger proportions of debt provided by private sources would 
make less segment reporting feasible. This suggests the 
following hypothesis:
H,;: The level of segment reporting disclosed by a firm
is negatively related to the level of debt 
provided by private sources.
The level of private debt (PRVDBT) will be operationalized 
as the ratio of debt provided by non-public sources to total 
assets.
Informed shareholders
Although there are benefits to shareholders of 
increased financial disclosure, there is a shareholder 
situation that does not result in more disclosure being the 
shareholders' preference. Kim (1993) explores the 
heterogeneous nature of a firm's shareholders. His study 
sees mandated disclosure rules as a result of conflicts 
among firms' shareholders with different risk attitudes and 
different access to inside information. There is no optimal 
policy equilibrium that is best for all shareholders.
Better informed shareholders prefer less disclosure than 
less well-informed shareholders. Increased disclosure makes
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investors more evenly informed and weakens the information 
advantage of the better informed. In practice, these better 
informed shareholders are assumed to be large-block 
shareholders who are active in management. It is not enough 
to just be a large-block shareholder as the desire to 
attract large-block investors has actually been shown to 
result in increased levels of disclosure (Diamond and 
Verrecchia 1991). The key is to be active in management as 
well. Because these well informed shareholders know the 
future prospects of the firm, they do not have to rely on 
public signals of the firm's true value. Minimizing 
disclosure means the firm saves the cost of disclosure, such 
as proprietary information gained by competitors. This 
benefit dominates potential gains from disclosure in the 
eyes of the well-informed, large, active shareholder, 
resulting in the following hypothesis:
Hj; : The level of segment reporting disclosed by a firm
is negatively related to the percentage of stock 
held by directors and officers.
The level of large shareholders who are active in management 
(DIRSTK) will be operationalized as the percentage of 
outstanding common stock owned by officers and directors. 
DIRSTK is expected to have a negative association with the 
level of segment reporting. Note that this is the same 
variable as being used to proxy for the level of dependence 
on external equity financing.
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3.1.2 Stakeholder effects of employees
Employees are a stakeholder group who have an interest 
in the financial condition of a fim. Often contracts 
between a firm and its employees are implied and are self- 
enforcing due to reputation effects. Bowen, DuCharme and 
Shores (1995) (EDS) studied the effect of different 
stakeholder groups on accounting method choice. Employees 
seem particularly applicable to the segment reporting issue. 
EDS developed arguments for the effect the interests of 
employees would have on accounting method choice. This 
reasoning can be applied to segment reporting as well. The 
effect of employee relations on the financial reporting of 
the firm may be mixed. On the one hand, a firm wants to 
appear stable and successful to attract employees.
Employees' implicit claims on a firm include a good working 
environment, security and prospects for the future. Firms 
with a unionized work force are involved in explicit 
contracting and may have different motivations. It may be 
costly to firms to reveal outstanding operating performance. 
EDS used the existence of a defined benefit pension plan as 
a proxy for existence of unions in the work force. They 
hypothesized and found a negative association between income 
increasing accounting methods and unionization. Applied to 
segment reporting, the desire to hide superior operating 
performance could be achieved through bundling a superior 
division with a lesser performing division. This leads to
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the following hypothesis;
Hag: The level of segment reporting disclosed by a firm
will be negatively associated with the existence 
of a unionized work force in the firm.
Following BDS, the proxy for the existence of a unionized 
work force will be a dummy variable indicating the existence 
of a defined benefit pension plan. There are problems with 
studying the potential union effect on levels of segment 
reporting. One is that it is unknown if the defined benefit 
pension plan proxy is an adequate signal for the presence of 
a union. It is possible that older firms have defined 
benefit plans whether there is a union work force or not.
It was noted in gathering the data that younger firms tended 
to have profit-sharing or defined contribution plans. 
Additionally, the union issue may be very industry driven.
If an effect was found using the pension plan proxy, it may 
be picking up an industry effect other than unions. Another 
problem is that the sample is predominately made up of 
defined benefit pension plan firms. 112 out of 162 (69%) 
firms in the sample have defined benefit pension plans.
3.1.3 Industry effects on segment reporting
Herding behavior
Dye and Sridhar (1995) analyzed firm disclosure 
behavior within industries. They viewed firms' voluntary
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disclosures as being motivated primarily by the resultant 
effect on firm value in the eyes of investors. They 
demonstrated a herding behavior for disclosure within 
industries. They attribute the herding behavior to the 
belief by firms that if one firm in the industry makes a 
disclosure, the market will assume the other firms in the 
industry have the information but withheld it. Even though 
segment reporting is a mandated disclosure, the large degree 
of latitude afforded managers in the development of the 
disclosure makes it take on characteristics of voluntary 
disclosure. Industry membership is expected to have 
explanatory power for the level of segment reporting, 
however no directions of associations are hypothesized.
Industry membership plays an additional role in 
modeling the level of segment reporting. Earlier it was 
noted that the different operating environments represented 
by industry membership may affect stakeholder relationships. 
Analyzing the level of segment reporting within industries 
will allow for those differences in modeling the level of 
segment reporting.
Barriers to entry
As discussed earlier, firms trade off the level of 
reporting investors would prefer with the level the firm 
would want competitors, or potential competitors, to 
possess. Newman and Sansing (1993) applied economic entry
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deterrence modeling to the discretionary disclosure issue.
No full-information equilibrium was found. A noisy signal 
(ie., low level segment reporting) is beneficial to 
shareholders when it deters entry.
Some industries naturally have more barriers to entry 
than others, depending on the complexity of the process or 
level of expertise needed to stay competitive. High 
barriers to entry may make the threat of entry into the 
industry by new firms lower, resulting in more precise 
information being disclosed. There are numerous measures 
that capture various components of barriers to entry. In 
this study, barriers to entry are proxied for using the 
level of capital intensity (property, plant and equipment as 
a percentage of total assets)(PPE) and research and 
development level (research and development expenses as a 
percentage of assets)(R&D)(Tirole, 1992). The 
following hypothesis is proposed capturing the barriers to 
entry industry effect:
H, : The level of segment reporting disclosed by a firm
is positively related to the level of barriers 
to entry.
The level of capital intensity and research and development 
are significantly associated with industry membership. 
Therefore, the barriers to entry effect is at least 
partially proxied for with analysis by industry. However, 
PPE and R&D will be included in the within-industry models
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to determine if they can provide explanation for within- 
industry segment reporting differences.
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
As previously mentioned, financial statement users' 
concerns have focused on the deficiency in segment 
reporting, particularly in the area of defining reportable 
segments. This study has been motivated by a desire to 
discover possible motivations underlying firms' segment 
reporting level decisions. This chapter includes a 
discussion of the sample selection process followed by a 
detailed description of the current segment reporting 
practices of the sample firms. Concluding the chapter are 
the hypotheses tests and results.
4.1 Sample selection
Six industries were subjectively selected to represent 
a mix of firms manufacturing durable and non-durable goods. 
The industries selected are Food Processing, Machinery, 
Chemicals, Electronics and Electrical (excepting computers), 
Transportation Equipment (excepting automobiles), and 
Textiles. 30 firms were randomly selected from within each 
industry. The selection process resulted in 162 firms’ 
having enough data available to be included in the study.
’In some industries, there were not firms available with 
full information for replacement, hence the sample fell 
short of 180 firms.
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Table 1 reports the complete list of companies included in 
the study. Also reported are total assets, sales, number of 
lines of business, number of segments included in the SFAS 
14 compliance segment reporting and the number of segments 
reported in the informal segment reporting included in parts 
of the annual report other than the financial statements. 
Table 2 reports the means of the above variables by 
industry.
Annual reports for each sample firm for years 19 91 
through 1995 were obtained for examination. Multiple years 
were necessary to observe changes in segments identified for 
reporting over the five year period. Because the levels- 
type variables utilized in the study change insignificantly 
across time and few segment reporting changes were noted, 
analysis of segment reporting practices and effects were 
performed on 1995 firm data. Detailed examination of the 
annual reports revealed that the SFAS 14 compliance segment 
reporting is not the only segment reporting provided by 
firms. Nearly all firms provide disaggregated data in the 
descriptive sections of the annual report outside of the 
formal financial statements. Firms have complete control 
over what data items are provided in the descriptive 
sections of the annual report. While the additional 
disaggregated data does not include all the items required 
by SFAS 14, it is, nonetheless, line of business financial 
reporting. For purposes of this study, formal segment
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reporting refers to reporting presented in accordance with 
SFAS 14, including all required items: sales, operating 
profit, capital expenditures, identifiable assets and 
depreciation. Formal segment reporting is normally found in 
the footnotes to the financial statements, but may be 
reported elsewhere in the annual report. If all data items 
required by SFAS 14 are included, then it is considered 
formal segment reporting regardless of where it is found in 
the annual report. Informal segment reporting refers to 
partial segment reporting provided in parts of the annual 
report which are outside the audited financial statements. 
The informal segment reporting normally includes sales by 
segment and often includes operating profit or market share 
by segment.
The following items were gathered for all companies for 
year 1995 from annual reports:
Segments defined for reporting
Disaggregated reporting in the annual report outside of
the formal financial statements
Firm research and development
Firm plant, property and equipment
Firm total assets
Public forms of debt
Private forms of debt
Stock repurchases
Type of pension/retirement plan
Growth in sales
The following item was obtained from the Disclosure
database :
Lines of business as assigned by the SEC 
The following items were obtained from proxy statements for
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1995 :
Stock-based portion of total executive compensation 
Percentage of common stock held by officers and 
directors
The following item was obtained from Valueline or Standard 
and Poor's Stock reports for 1995:
Market beta
4.2 Changes in segment reporting
One of the user concerns about segment reporting 
previously discussed was the abundance of changes in segment 
definition from year to year. Harris (1994) found evidence 
of frequent changes in the way firms presented their 
business segments from year to year. The segment reporting 
footnotes or supplementary data were examined using annual 
reports for years 1991 through 1995 for each firm to 
document any changes in segment reporting. Changes could 
take the form of different segments being identified for 
reporting purposes or the level of detail provided for each 
segment. User concerns and prior research have highlighted 
frequent changes in segment definition from year to year as 
a deficiency in adequate segment reporting. The changes 
documented by this study portray less manipulation than 
originally expected. Out of the 162 companies included in 
the study, only four companies had actual changes in their 
formal segment reporting between years 1991 and 1995 that 
could not be explained by mergers, acquisitions, disposals
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or discontinuance of operations. Structural firm changes 
such as these lead to an appropriate change in segments 
identified for disclosure and would not be the result of 
changing the way divisions or lines of business are grouped 
for disclosure. Following is a discussion of the four 
companies who were found to have changes in their formal 
segment reporting from 1991 to 1995.
In 1991, Sterling Chemicals gave sales information only 
for two segments in the descriptive portion of the annual 
report and reported on geographic segment data only in the 
footnotes to the financial statements. In 1995, Sterling 
provided all required items for the same two segments, again 
in the descriptive portion of the annual report. No 
particular reason could be identified for this increase in 
reporting except that their overall reporting in the annual 
report became more sophisticated over the five years.
Delta Woodside formally reported three segments in 
1991, two types of fabric segments and an apparel segment.
In 1995, they had combined the fabric segments into one 
segment and continued to show the apparel segment.
Springs Industries, also in the textile industry, 
combined two different fabric segments, finished and 
industrial, into one fabric segment called specialty 
fabrics.
In years 1991 through 1994, OEA identified two segments 
for formal reporting, government contracting and commercial.
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In 1995, they still reported two segments, but were sorted 
differently into automotive and non-automotive. This was a 
move to define segments by product line rather than customer 
base, although the non-automotive segment appears to 
primarily be made up of the old government contracting 
segment.
This sample includes firms within a wide size range 
(See Table 2) and does not reflect any size related 
reporting patterns. Whether or not the firms included in 
the study are representative of the population of firms user 
groups and researchers have analyzed in the past is not 
known. However, this group of 162 firms representing six 
industries does not appear to exhibit frequent changes in 
segment definition for reporting purposes.
4.3 Segments reported versus lines of business
The "level" of segment reporting as used in this study
refers to the segments defined for disclosure relative to 
the lines of business in which the firm operates. The lines 
of business (SIC codes) in which the firm operates are 
assigned by the SEC at the time of a firm's initial public 
offering and are updated annually from narrative provided 
regarding new developments by the firm in Form lOK. Form 
lOK requires a firm to provide a description of business 
that encompasses three main areas: 1) Development of
business, which includes new operations, mergers,
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acquisitions, dispositions, plans for new securities 
offerings and how the money is to be used, etc., 2)
Financial information about industry segments, which is 
usually a reference to see the segment reporting provided in 
the annual report and 3) Narrative description of business, 
which includes descriptions of products and services, 
competitive environment, sources and availability of raw 
materials, seasonality, major customers, etc.
The lines of business as assigned by the SEC from the 
firm's explanation of its operations is independent of a 
firm's identification of segments to be reported in the 
annual report. However, it is plausible to consider the 
lines of business as identified by the SEC as an outline of 
what segments could be identified by a firm for reporting, 
examination of the U.S. Standard Industrial Classifications 
(SIC) revealed that the SIC codes at the four-digit level 
may separate lines of business too finely to match with the 
way firms operate. Additionally, the four-digit SIC codes, 
as assigned by the SEC, may include very minor areas of 
operation that differ only slightly from other operations. 
After reviewing the SIC code categories, it was determined 
that natural breaks in segment identification would be 
reasonable at the two-digit level. In other words, this 
author maintains that lines of business that are the same at 
the two-digit level could reasonably be combined for 
reporting purposes. Lines of business that are different at
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the two-digit level are considered to be different "enough"
to necessitate reporting as separate segments. For purposes 
of this study, the number of different SIC codes at the two- 
digit level for each sample firm is the minimum expectation 
of the number of segments disclosed for adequate segment 
reporting. Table 3 reports the breakdown of firms into the 
number of lines of business they are engaged in when 
separated at the two-digit level, hereafter referred to as 
lines of business (LOB). Analysis of the lines of business 
reports that 63% of firms are operating in two or more lines 
of business.
Table 4 presents a breakdown of the frequency of the 
actual number of segments reported both formally (FSSEGS) 
and informally (MDASEGS). Over 56% of sample firms maintain 
they operate in one segment (firms with one FSSEGS or 
MDASEGS are providing no segment reporting). However, the 
analysis in the second panel reveals that nearly 70% of 
firms offer partial segment reporting for two or more 
segments.
Many firms will state they operate in one segment in 
the footnotes to the financial statement while presenting 
sales and other data for several segments in the descriptive 
portion of the annual report. Panel 3 of Table 4 highlights 
the frequency of this behavior as well as all firms who 
disaggregate more informally than they do in their formal 
segment reporting. 49 firms (30%) in the sample provide no
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disaggregated segment data formally or informally. Another 
58 firms (36%) provide segment data both formally and 
informally for the same number of segments. The remaining 
55 firms (34%) provide segment data for more segments 
informally than the number of segments reported in the 
formal segment reporting footnote. This number includes 42 
firms who maintain they operate in one segment for formal 
segment reporting purposes, but then offer partial segment 
data on as many as eight divisions or product lines in the 
narrative portion of the annual report.
The number of segments a firm chooses to report 
relative to the lines of business in which they are engaged 
could be viewed as the firm's chosen "level" of segment
reporting. Above, lines of business and segments reported 
both formally and informally were discussed. Table 5 
presents a cross-tabulation of the segments reported, both 
formally and informally, by the number of lines of business. 
Panel 1 addresses formal segment reporting. Of the 91 firms 
not providing any formal segment reporting, 42 of them are 
operating in two or more lines of business. However, as 
shown in Panel 2, the number of firms not providing any 
segment reporting even when operating in multiple lines of 
business drops to 22 when informal segment reporting is 
included. Overall, at the formal level, 64 firms out of 162 
(40%) report fewer segments than they have lines of 
business. The frequency of this behavior is much less when
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including partial or informal segment reporting. Looking at 
Panel 2, the firms providing data for fewer segments than 
their number of lines of business sums to 43 of 162 firms 
(27%).
What is as interesting as the possible deficiencies in 
segment reporting as discussed above, is the evidence 
provided of segment reporting that may well exceed the 
minimum requirements of the segment reporting standard. 
Summing the number of firms who formally report more 
segments than they have lines of business, 22 firms (14%) 
are providing this high level of disaggregation. Informal, 
or partial, segment reporting as shown in Panel 2 is even 
more dramatic with 64 firms out of 162 (40%) providing more 
disaggregation than lines of business.
In summary, of the sample firms, 46% provide full 
segment reporting for the same number of segments as lines 
of business. 40% of the sample firms provide full segment 
reporting for fewer segments than lines of business and 14% 
provide full segment reporting for more segments than they 
have lines of business. Including partial, or informal, 
segment reporting in the analysis of firms' disclosure 
behaviors, of the sample firms, 33% provide data for the 
same number of segments as lines of business. 27% provide 
data for fewer segments and 40% provide data for more 
segments than they have lines of business. Whether looking 
at full segment reporting or partial segment reporting, the
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majority of firms are providing data for at least as many 
segments as the lines of business in which they are engaged.
4,4 Hypotheses tests
The following equation, estimated with ordinary least 
squares regression'', summarizes the explanatory variables 
used to test hypotheses 1-7:
LEVEL. = B-. + B BONDS, + flDEFBEN. + S-.DIRSTK. + B,DIVING. 
+ B. EXCOMP, + B^GROWTH. + B-PP&E, + B:PRVDBT. +
B-.R&D. + B- STKREP.
Where :
LEVEL = number of segments reported divided by the number of 
lines of business at the two digit SIC code level in 
which the firm operates as assigned by the SEC. This 
variable will be expressed as LEVELI and LEVELII 
representing the variable calculated using the number
The small range of possible numbers making up both the 
numerator and denominator cause the dependent variables to 
be somewhat discreet and their distributions are somewhat 
bi-modal. Logistical regressions were estimated for the 
entire sample divided between underreporters and even or 
overreporters and the sample divided between underreporters 
and overreporters. The results were not different from the 
models when estimated using OLS. This result is not 
surprising given the results of a study comparing Probit and 
OLS in small samples (n=50 and 100)(Noreen, 1988). Noreen 
found that when the null hypothesis was true, OLS regression 
test statistics conformed closely to their theoretical 
distributions, closer than Probit. When the alternative 
hypothesis was true, OLS appeared to be as powerful as 
Probit. Model specification checks revealed no evidence of 
heteroskedasticity or multicollinearity.
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of segments defined for formal segment reporting and 
the number of segments defined for informal segment 
reporting.
BONDS = amount of debt from public sources divided by total 
assets. Bonds is expected to have a positive 
association with LEVEL.
DEFBEN = dummy variable representing existence of a defined 
benefit pension plan as an indicator of a unionized 
work force. DEFBEN is expected to have a negative 
association with LEVEL.
DIRSTK = percentage of stock held or controlled by officers 
and directors. DIRSTK is expected to have a negative 
association with LEVEL.
DIVING = a dummy variable representing an increase in
dividend payout per share from years 1991 through 1995. 
DIV is expected to have a negative association with 
LEVEL.
EXCOMP = value of stock based compensation granted in a year 
relative to the total executive compensation. EXCOMP 
is expected to have a positive association with LEVEL.
GROWTH = sample period growth in sales. GROWTH is expected 
to have a positive association with LEVEL.
PPE = property, plant and equipment divided by total assets 
PPE is expected to have a positive association with 
LEVEL.
PRVDBT = amount of debt from private sources divided by
total assets. PRVDBT is expected to have a negative 
association with LEVEL.
R&D = research and development expense divided by total 
assets. R&D is expected to have a positive 
association with LEVEL.
STKREP = amount expended on stock repurchases divided by 
total assets. STKREP is expected to have a negative 
association with LEVEL.
Industry membership effects
As discussed in Chapter 4, industry membership is
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expected to have an effect on segment reporting levels due 
to herding behavior and varying levels of competition 
between industries. As reported in Table 6, an analysis of 
segment reporting, both levels and raw number of segments 
reported, by industry reveals significant differences.
There are significant differences in means for informal 
segment reporting and the actual number of segments reported 
both formally and informally. Industry means for formal 
segment reporting are not significantly different across 
industries.
The herding behavior explanation for different levels 
of segment reporting among industries may indicate intercept 
shifts for membership in certain industries. This would 
assume that industry membership effects could be picked up 
with industry dummy variables, forcing the slopes for the 
various effects to remain constant across all industries. 
However, it is more likely that the different operating 
environments dictated by industry membership alter the 
dynamics between firms and the various stakeholder groups. 
Therefore, it is more appropriate to control for industry 
effects by estimating the segment reporting level 
explanatory models within industries as well as for the 
sample as a whole. The capital intensity and research and 
development variables will partially proxy for industry 
effects in the models estimated for the whole sample.
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size effects
Firm size effects have historically been pervasive in 
affecting researchers' ability to study other effects in 
many types of studies (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
Correlation analysis, as shown in Table 7, reveals 
significant correlation between firm size, represented by 
total assets, and the level of formal segment reporting 
(LEVELI). A plot revealed that segment reporting levels are 
well scattered without pattern except among the largest of 
the sample firms. Adding a control variable for size to the 
explanatory models does not seem logical in light of the 
variation in segment reporting across firms of all sizes. 
Removal of two firms from the pool of firms used to estimate 
models for formal segment reporting, LEVELI, removed the 
significant correlation between total assets and LEVELI as 
shown in the second panel of Table 7.
4.4.1 Explaining segment reporting levels across all sample 
firms
Table 8 provides Pearson correlations for the dependent 
variables, LEVELI and LEVELII, and the independent 
variables. DIRSTK is significantly correlated with both 
LEVELI and LEVELII. EXCOMP is significantly correlated with 
LEVELII. Correlations between the dependent and independent 
variables and correlations among the independent variables 
were considered in estimating various forms of the
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explanatory model.
Formal segment reporting
Table 9 reports the results of five models estimated on 
the variable LEVELI (formal segments reported/lines of 
business). A check for outliers resulted in one observation 
which was Winsorized. The first model includes all 
variables included in the model presented at the beginning 
of section 4.4. In models two through five, various 
variables have been removed based on their lack of 
association with LEVELI and impact on other dependent 
variables. Even though multicollinearity technically is not 
present, the high level of correlation between some of the 
independent variables affects the results by robbing 
explanatory power from individual variables. As shown in 
Table 8, DIRSTK is highly correlated with BONDS, DEFBEN, 
DIVING, EXCOMP, and GROWTH. Model 2 has improved 
explanatory power and reveals significant associations 
between the level of formal segment reporting and the 
percentage of stock held by officers and directors (DIRSTK) 
and growth in sales (GROWTH). Additionally, the 
associations are in the hypothesized direction. Other forms 
of the model are not more revealing. DIRSTK is the only 
variable that consistently remains significant regardless of 
the relations among the other independent variables.
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Informal segment reporting
Table 10 contains the results of models estimated to
explain informal segment reporting (LEVELII) across all 
sample firms. A check for outliers revealed four 
observations which were Winsorized. Model 1 contains all 
variables included in the hypotheses. Explanatory power is 
improved in modeling informal segment reporting versus 
formal segment reporting. This is intuitively appealing as 
firms have more control over informal segment reporting than 
formal segment reporting. This result reinforces the idea 
that reporting objectives can be met by managers using 
informal segment reporting without too much information 
being revealed to competitors. Informal segment reporting 
can be used to reduce the "cost" of disaggregated reporting.
Throughout all variations of the model, DIRSTK, EXCOMP 
and GROWTH are significant effects in the hypothesized 
directions. It should be noted when comparing Model 1 to 
the other models that the inclusion of research and 
development (R&D) as an explanatory variable has a two-fold 
effect. One effect is the association of the variable with 
the dependent variable and its correlations with the other 
independent variables. The other effect is that including 
R&D significantly reduces the size of the sample. Not all 
firms report R&D. The group of firms remaining in the 
sample when R&D is included may share some characteristics 
that alter the ability of estimated models to explain
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segment reporting levels.
Exploration of research and development reporting effect 
Before proceeding with further discussion of the 
results of the data analysis, the effect of the research and 
development variable (R&D) warrants investigation. As 
discussed above, R&D is not available for all firms, which 
changes the pool of firms used to estimate segment reporting 
level explanatory models when R&D is included. Table 11 
provides insight into the potential effect the reduction in 
the sample has on the ability to explain segment reporting 
levels. Panel A presents the firms, by industry, divided 
into two groups, those that report research and development 
and those that do not. Nearly all firms in the machinery, 
chemical and electrical/electronic industries report 
research and development. The food and textile firms 
predominantly do not report research and development. Only 
the transportation industry does not seem to take a clear 
position on research and development reporting. This is a 
clear example of the herding behavior theory regarding 
disclosure discussed earlier. What is apparent from this is 
that in the models estimated utilizing the entire sample, 
the food and textiles industries are not represented when 
R&D is included as an explanatory variable. The results of 
the analysis performed on an industry by industry basis will 
reveal why explanatory power for the entire sample is
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improved when the R&D variable virtually removes food and 
textile firms from the sample.
Panel B of Table 11 reports differences in the means of 
other variables between firms who do report research and 
development and firms that do not report research and 
development. The significance level reported is from a two- 
tailed test. LEVELII, the level of informal segment 
reporting, is significantly different between the two 
groups. If the voluntary reporting of research and 
development is an indication of a 'more disclosure' firm 
strategy, then it follows that the mean level of segment 
reporting would be higher for that group. DIRSTK, EXCOMP 
and PRVDBT all have significant differences between the two 
groups. Following the logic described in discussing the 
LEVELII difference, the directions of the differences are 
intuitive. Based on disclosure theory as applied to EXCOMP 
in Chapter 3, the expectation would be that higher EXCOMP 
levels would allow for more disclosure. Again following the
theory as discussed in Chapter 3, higher levels DIRSTK and
PRVDBT would allow for less disclosure. Knowing the
characteristics of the firms who report research and
development and the firms that do not report research and 
development will aid the interpretation of the results of
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models estimated with and without the R&D explanatory 
variable.
Exploration of the effect of single line of business firms 
37% of the firms included in the sample operate in one 
line of business, as defined by this study. These firms, in 
theory, would not be expected to include segment reporting 
in their annual report. However, 11 of the 60 single line 
of business firms report two or more segments in formal 
segment reporting and 33 of the 60 single line of business 
firms report two or more segments in informal segment 
reporting. This overreporting demonstrates that single line 
of business firms are subject to factors that are associated 
with more disclosure as well as multi-line of business 
firms. The inclusion of single line of business firms in 
the sample does create a situation where a firm's choice to 
not segment report results in a segment reporting level of 1 
(1/1). Firms such as this may not be the same as firms who 
are in three lines of business and report three segments, 
also a reporting level of 1 (3/3) . The single line of 
business firms could be dampening the explanatory power of 
the effects hypothesized, particularly across industries. 
Tables 8A, 9A and lOA report Pearson correlations and 
results of models estimated on the entire sample, minus the 
single line of business firms. The same variables, DIRSTK 
and GROWTH, are significantly associated with LEVELI,
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however, explanatory power of the models are improved. In 
models estimating LEVELII, DIRSTK and R&D are found to be 
significantly associated, which differs from models 
estimated on the entire sample. DIRSTK and EXCOMP were 
significantly associated with LEVELII when using the entire 
sample. Again, explanatory power of the models estimated 
for LEVELII was improved when single line of business firms 
were removed. Single line of business firms will not be 
removed when analyzing by industry due to sample sizes.
4.4.2 Explaining segment reporting levels within industries
Earlier, it was demonstrated that segment reporting 
levels differ across industries. The industry differences 
in segment reporting may be due to the herding behavior 
discussed in Chapter 3 or it may be due to operating and 
structural differences inherent to the individual 
industries. Operating or structural differences would 
impact the interaction between firms and their stakeholders, 
potentially impacting financial disclosure decisions. This 
possibility demands analysis of segment reporting levels 
within industries. Various models utilizing the effects 
considered in hypotheses 1-7 were estimated within 
industries.
Food and kindred products
Table 12 reports the results of a Pearson correlation
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analysis among the variables. BONDS, DEFBEN, DIRSTK and 
EXCOMP demonstrate potential in explaining segment reporting 
levels. Table 13 contains the results of five models 
estimated to explain the level of formal segment reporting 
(LEVELI). The models were designed to account for 
correlations between the dependent variable and the 
explanatory variables and the correlations among the 
explanatory variables. DIRSTK is the only variable with 
consistent significant association with LEVELI.
Table 14 contains the results of models estimated to 
explain informal segment reorting (LEVELII). Explanatory 
power is enhanced when estimating models for LEVELII. As 
discussed before, the explanatory variables may have more 
impact in informal segment reporting where there is more 
management control over the disclosure. EXCOMP has a large 
coefficient and high level of significance with LEVELII, 
indicating a strong effect on the level of informal segment 
reporting.
Machinery manufacturing industry
Table 15 reports the results of a Pearson correlation 
analysis among the dependent and independent variables 
within the machinery manufacturing industry. Only R&D has 
an obvious correlation with LEVELI. However, the 
correlation is in the opposite direction of that 
hypothesized. The correlations within the explanatory
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variables make several combinations possible to gain 
explanatory power. As demonstrated in Table 16, R&D is 
significantly associated with LEVELI. Additionally GROWTH 
adds explanatory power. Again, the association for both R&D 
and GROWTH are in the opposite direction of that 
hypothesized. An examination of the firms included in the 
sample for this industry reveals that size may play a role 
in the reporting. Earlier it was discussed that size was 
not found to be associated with the level of segment 
reporting after the removal of two firms from the sample as 
a whole. However, within this particular industry, the 
distribution is nearly categorical between large and small 
firms. The small firms demonstrate more underreporting as 
well as higher GROWTH and R&D. This explains higher GROWTH 
and R&D being associated with less reporting for this 
industry. The inclusion of R&D in the machinery 
manufacturing industry only excludes five sample firms from 
the estimation.
The estimation of models for informal segment reporting 
(LEVELII) is not similar to estimating LEVELI. The level of 
stock held or controlled by officers and directors and the 
existence of a defined benefit pension plan are found to be 
significantly associated with LEVELII, and in the 
hypothesized direction. Again, the inclusion of R&D, even 
when not significant, enhances explanatory power as shown in 
Model 5. Apparently, similar characteristics and behavior
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within the research and development reporting group of firms 
enhances the ability to model the chosen level of 
disclosure.
Chemicals and allied products manufacturing industry
The results of the Pearson correlation analysis among 
the variables for firms in the chemicals industry are 
presented in Table 18. DIRSTK, EXCOMP and GROWTH have 
significant correlations with LEVELI and/or LEVELII. Table 
19 reports the results of models estimated for the level of 
formal segment reporting (LEVELI). DIRSTK is the only 
variable with a significant association with LEVELI. Model 
1 includes R&D, which adds explanatory power with its near­
significant association with LEVELI and its reduction in 
sample size.
The variation in informal segment reporting is better 
explained by the hypothesized variables. DIRSTK and GROWTH 
are found to be significantly associated, and in the 
hypothesized direction, with LEVELII.
Transportation equipment manufacturing industry
Pearson correlations among the variables for firms in 
the transportation equipment manufacturing industry are 
reported in Table 21. GROWTH, PP&E and R&D are found to 
have significant or near-significant correlations with 
LEVELI and/or LEVELII. As shown in Table 22, explanatory
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power is enhanced when the sample is restricted by the 
inclusion of R&D, even though R&D is not significantly 
associated with LEVELI. Correlations among the explanatory 
variables provide differing results in the model estimation. 
When R&D is included, PP&E is a significant effect, although 
not in the hypothesized direction. GROWTH is the only 
significant explanatory variable when R£cD is omitted from 
the model.
Table 23 demonstrates impressive ability to explain the 
variation in informal segment reporting with the 
hypothesized effects. GROWTH, R&D and PP&E are shown to be 
significant, again with a significantly reduced sample due 
to the inclusion of R&D. An examination of the firms making 
up the transportation manufacturing industry reveals that 
the reporting of research and development may create a sub­
group within the industry that are more alike. There is a 
wide variety of processes and customer bases within the 
sample firms. The R&D variable may filter firms resulting 
in a more homogeneous sample of firms.
Textile mill products industry
Table 24 contains the results of the Pearson 
correlation analysis for the textile mill products industry. 
BONDS and PP&E are shown to have significant correlations 
with segment reporting levels. R&D is not a presence in 
this industry. As shown in Table 25, BONDS and PP&E are
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significant effects in explaining the variation in LEVELI. 
Contrary to what has been observed in other industries, 
hypothesized variables are less effective in explaining the 
variation in LEVELII than in LEVELI. Table 26 reports the 
results of estimation of models for LEVELII. BONDS are 
found to be a significant effect. PP&E, while not 
portraying a significant coefficient, does add explanatory 
power to the model, as shown by Models 2 and 3.
Electrical and electronic machinery, equipment and supplies
industry (except computers)
Table 27 contains the Pearson correlations among 
variables for firms within the electrical/electronics 
industry. There are no significant correlations between 
formal and informal levels of segment reporting and the 
explanatory variables. However, the correlations among the 
explanatory variables make it possible for the sample to be 
blocked in such a way to find associations. Table 28 
reveals that blocking the sample with DEFBEN allows for the 
impact of GROWTH to be revealed. However, it is important 
to note again that the restriction of the sample by the 
inclusion of R&D enhances the explanatory power of the 
models estimated.
Variations in informal segment reporting do not seem to 
be affected by the hypothesized variables. As shown in 
Table 29, DIRSTK has near significant associations, but the 
intercept is predominantly capturing the explanatory power.
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Summary
Most of the variables hypothesized to be associated 
with the level of segment reporting have been shown to be 
significant factors, at least within some industries. Table 
3 0 provides an overview of the variables that were shown to 
be significant by industry and for the entire sample.
Because sample sizes are small in the within industry 
analyses, Table 3 0 also provides a summary of when the signs 
on the variables were in the hypothesized direction 
regardless of the significance level of the association with 
segment reporting levels. The percentage of stock held or 
controlled by officers and directors (DIRSTK) and growth in 
sales over the sample period (GROWTH) were the only factors 
found to be significantly associated with the level of 
formal segment reporting (LEVELI) for the sample as a whole. 
Informal segment reporting levels (LEVELII) across the 
entire sample were found to be associated with DIRSTK,
GROWTH and the percentage of executive compensation that is 
stock-based (EXCOMP).
However, when models for LEVELI and LEVELII were 
estimated across sample firms within industries, most of the 
other variables were found to have explanatory power within 
various industries. Only the existence of dividend 
increases (DIVING) and stock repurchases as a percentage of 
total assets (STKREP) are not found to be significant 
effects. DIRSTK and GROWTH are found to be the most
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pervasive effects across the various industries and the 
sample as a whole.
In summary, evidence has been provided to support 
hypotheses 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7. There is no evidence of 
support for hypothesis 3. The need to have access to the 
capital market as proxied for by GROWTH has the most 
consistent effect on segment reporting levels. The counter 
effect to that, as proxied for by DIRSTK, meaning that 
higher levels of DIRSTK indicate less reliance on external 
stakeholders, has the second most broad effect.
Additionally, industry membership was found to be a 
significant factor in firm choices of segment reporting 
levels. This was demonstrated by significant differences in 
segment reporting levels among industries (Table 6). The 
industry membership effect was also demonstrated by 
differences in explanatory variables found to be 
significantly associated with segment reporting levels 
across industries.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Many groups of financial statement users have stated 
that segment disclosure is important to them in their 
analyses of firms. These groups have also been critical of 
the large degree of latitude allowed management by SFAS 14 
in defining and reporting business segment information.
Past concerns have included the possibility that this 
flexibility allows for inconsistency in reporting quality 
between firms and within firms across time. An example of 
this inconsistency are past observations of frequent changes 
in firms' segment definition for reporting from year to 
year.
This dissertation extends prior segment reporting 
research by studying the association between underlying firm 
characteristics, such as stakeholder relationships and 
specific industry characteristics, and the level of segment 
reporting. This dissertation also extends prior segment 
reporting research by including an examination of informal, 
or partial, segment reporting offered in management's 
descriptive portion of the annual report. Many firms 
provide more disaggregation in parts of the annual report 
outside the audited financial statements. Because it is 
outside the audited financial statements, management can 
control what data is provided. Normally sales and possibly 
another piece of information such as operating income or 
market share is provided by segment. This segment reporting
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does not meet the requirements of SFAS 14, hence the terra 
"informal segment reporting" is coined.
The approach of this study was to select a sample of 
the size that allowed for in-depth examination of firms' 
entire financial reporting. This allowed for a detailed 
description of what segment reporting actually consists and 
how that compares to past concerns about segment reporting.
One interesting finding of the study was the lack of 
evidence to support segment reporting critics' claims that 
firms frequently change the segments defined for reporting. 
Out of 162 firms, only four firms changed the segments 
defined for reporting, across years 1991 through 1995, that 
was not due to a merger, acquisition, disposal or 
discontinuance of operations. This study's detailed 
analysis of annual reports allowed all structural changes 
that would, in turn, appropriately affect segments reported, 
to be identified.
Additionally, prior criticisms have cited the lack of 
adequate disaggregation in the segments defined for 
reporting. It is true that many firms maintain they operate 
in only one business segment, when in fact, the SEC has 
assigned them multiple SIC codes upon analyzing their 
operations. For this study, lines of business necessitating 
separate segment disclosure was defined to be SIC codes at 
the two-digit level. In this study's sample, 63% of the 
sample operate in two or more lines of business. Less than
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44% of the sample provide full segment reporting for two or 
more segments. However, if the informal, or partial, 
segment reporting offered in the annual report is 
considered, the number of firms providing data for two or 
more segments jumps to 70%.
40% of the firms in the sample provide full segment 
reporting for fewer segments than they have lines of 
business. While this percentage appears troublesome, there 
are significant cases of "over-reporting". 14% of the
sample provide full segment reporting for more segments than 
they have lines of business. When informal, or partial, 
segment reporting is included, the numbers are more 
promising. 27% of the sample provided data for fewer 
segments than they had lines of business and 40% provided 
more disaggregation in reporting than they had lines of 
business. Apparently firms do not categorically bundle 
their segments to obscure their activity and performance by 
line of business. The focus of this study was well-placed 
to attempt to identify factors affecting the levels of 
segment reporting selected by firms.
The informal, or partial, segment reporting provided by 
firms always consisted of sales and sometimes included 
operating profit and market share. What was glaringly 
absent from the informal reporting was capital expenditures 
and identifiable assets. It is possible that firms are 
anxious to provide investors with performance information on
68
a disaggregated level. However, capital expenditures relay 
where resources have been allocated and may reveal to 
competitors more information than desirable. Capital 
expenditures reveals a firm's positioning for the future, 
where sales is past activity that is usually well-known 
among industry members anyway. Current discussion regarding 
segment reporting regulation has had the tone that less 
flexibility allowed by financial accounting standards would 
improve segment reporting. The findings of this study 
provide evidence that a reduction in the required data items 
may encourage more disaggregated data being provided.
Segment reporting is a required financial disclosure. 
However, the flexibility in SFAS 14 allows segment reporting 
to take on characteristics of voluntary disclosure. 
Therefore, this study draws on theories developed in the 
disclosure literature to attempt to explain the 
disaggregation levels in segment reporting chosen by firms. 
Several of the stakeholder relationships and industry 
characteristics posited to affect segment reporting levels 
were found to be significant. Industry membership was found 
to be a significant factor in a firm's chosen level of 
segment reporting. Informal segment reporting levels were 
found to differ on average across industries. Two 
reasonable explanations for an industry membership effect 
exist. One would be the disclosure herding behavior within 
industries included in the discussion of disclosure
69
theories. Another would be differences in the competitive 
environment present, as represented by the barriers-to-entry 
variables, R&D and PP&E.
The other industry based variables, level of research 
and development (R&D) and level of plant, property and 
equipment (PP&E) had limited findings of association with 
segment reporting levels. PP&E was a significant effect 
within the textiles and transportation manufacturing 
industries. R&D had a confounding effect on the study. It 
was directly found to have association with segment 
reporting levels in the machinery and transportation 
manufacturing industries. However, the inclusion of R&D as 
an explanatory variable reduced the pool of firms included 
in the estimation of the models. R&D is not reported by all 
firms. The reduction in the pool of firms actually improved 
explanatory power in the various models. Apparently, the 
shared characteristics of firms who voluntarily disclose 
research and development expenditures result in a sub-sample 
of firms who are more similarly affected by the hypothesized 
effects. An outgrowth of this study already in progress is 
to study the disclosure of research and development along 
with segment "over-reporting" as voluntary disclosures
driven by certain firm characteristics.
The stakeholder effect found to be the most pervasive 
is the level of reliance on the external capital market as 
proxied for by growth in sales (GROWTH) and percentage of
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stock held or controlled by officers and directors (DIRSTK). 
GROWTH was hypothesized and found to have a positive 
association with the level of segment reporting. Higher 
growth indicates a potential future need for capital, hence 
more information is provided as desired by investors.
DIRSTK was hypothesized and found to have a negative 
association with the level of segment reporting. More stock 
controlled by officers and directors indicates less reliance 
on external financing. DIRSTK was a also a proxy for the 
effect on disclosure of informed shareholders. The larger 
the proportion of shareholders who are informed because of 
active involvement in the firm, the lower the need for 
disclosure to outside parties. DIRSTK was used as a proxy 
for two effects expressed in Hypotheses 1 and 5, therefore 
the exact source of its significant association is not 
known. However, reliance on the external capital market and 
the lack of need to disclose when higher levels of 
shareholders are informed through active participation are 
probably simultaneous scenarios that actually address the 
same effect. Overall, the significant, negative association 
of DIRSTK to segment reporting levels can be attributed to 
reliance on the external capital market. Earlier discussion 
of disclosure theory included the idea that access to the 
capital market is a motivation for increased disclosure as 
investors will be less interested in firms that are 
difficult to analyze. The evidence that a need for external
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investors drives increased levels of segment reporting 
indicates that the flexibility built into SFAS 14 may not be 
misplaced. The market may discipline firms to find the 
appropriate segment reporting level.
The level of stock-based executive compensation 
(EXCOMP) is also a proxy for motivation provided by the 
external capital market. EXCOMP was found to be a 
significant effect for informal segment reporting across all 
sample firms, as well as the food and kindred products 
manufacturing industry. Other effects involving the capital 
market (BONDS), private financing (PRVDBT) and employee 
relations (DEFBEN) were found to be significant within one 
or more industries.
The only hypothesis that was not supported was 
regarding the choice by firms to communicate with the market 
in other ways when disclosure may competitively disadvantage 
the firm. Dividend increases as a signal to the market 
precluding increased disclosure (DIVINC) was not supported 
as being associated with segment reporting levels. 
Additionally, stock repurchases as a signal to the market of 
financial and operating strength, precluding increased 
disclosure (STKREP) did not find support as a significant 
effect.
A potential effect on formal segment reporting that has 
been included in an extension of this work is the effect of 
the audit firm on formal segment reporting. It is possible
72
that auditing firms systematically apply a firm-specific 
interpretation of SFAS 14 across audit clients. Firm 
training and financial reporting guidelines ensure a certain 
level of consistency in auditing techniques and reporting 
expectations within firms. The audit firm may provide a 
regulatory effect on the level of formal segment reporting 
disclosed, which could override the firm's segment reporting 
level choice.
This study is especially timely due to the FASB's 
current re-evaluation of segment reporting requirements.
The results of this study, both in terms of what segment 
reporting currently consists as well as factors that affect 
firms' chosen disaggregation levels of segment reporting, 
will provide useful information to standard setters and 
other segment reporting or disclosure researchers. The lack 
of evidence to support frequent redefinition of segments and 
the evidence that many firms actually provide more 
disaggregation than would be expected by their operations 
should be considered in the policy-making process. 
Apparently, the policy-making process should not assume that 
the current financial reporting standard regulating segment 
reporting is resulting in mass under-reporting or 
manipulation.
Additionally, this study highlights the fact that the 
formal financial statements do not completely encompass a 
firm's financial reporting. Increased disaggregation
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outside the formal financial statements may indicate 
discomfort with the current segment reporting regulation. 
Firms attempt to achieve their financial reporting goals 
outside of the audited financial statements. This informal, 
management-controlled information is provided directly to 
current investors and analysts and is available to all 
potential investors. Researchers gathering data items via 
financial statement databases may be missing this 
complementary financial information.
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TABLE 1
Listing of companies included in the study, 
their total assets, sales, lines of business (per SIC codes as reported by the SEC) 
lines of business categorized by the first two SIC code digits, 
number of segments reported in formal segment reporting, 
number of segments with partial reporting elsewhere in the annual report
COMPANY NAME TOTAL ASSETS 
(in thous)
SALES 
(in thous)
LOB FSSEGS MDASEGS
FOOD PROCESSING:
ALPINE LACE BRANDS 26,276 145,053 2 2 2
CAMPBELL SOUP CO. 6,315,000 7,278,000 1 1 3
CHIQÜITA BRANDS INTL 2,623,533 2,565,992 2 I 1
DEAN FOODS CO 1,202,426 2,630,182 1
DOLE FOOD CO 2,442,192 3,804,000 1 1 3
FLOWERS INDUSTRIES 655,921 1,129,203 1 1 1
FOODBRANDS AMERICA 521,763 634,700 1 1 4
GENERAL MILLS 3,358,200 5,026,700 1 1
GOLDEN ENTERPRISES 52,011 128,145 3 1 1
H J HEINZ COMPANY 8,247,188 8,470,000 1 1 1
KELLOGG COMPANY 4,414,600 7,003,700 1 1 1
LANCE, INC. 256,460 356,055 1 1 1
MCCORMICK Sc CO. 1,614,341 1,858,694 3 1 4
MICHAEL FOODS, INC. 359,227 536,627 4 1 5
MIDWEST GRAIN PROD. 176,749 180,252 2 1 6
QUAKER OATS CO. 4,826,900 6,365,200 1 1 3
RALSTON PURINA CO. 4,567,200 7,210,300 2 4
RYMER FOODS, INC. 24,602 79,920 2 1 1
SARA LEE CORP 12,431,000 17,719,000 4 4
SENECA FOODS CORP 381,726 234,073 2 1 1
J. M. SMUCKER CO. 421,017 628,279 1 1 1
TASTY BAKING CO 85,302 141,831 1 1 1
TOFUTTI BRANDS INC. 1,545 5,023 1 1 1
UNITED FOODS, INC. 114,157 135,137 2 1 1
UNIVERSAL FOODS 776,870 792,971 1 1 5
VIE DE FRANCE 29,912 30,922 3 1 4
MACHINERY : 
ALLIED PRODUCTS 166,743 260,861 1 1 I
BRUNSWICK CORP 2,360,500 3,041,400 4 2
CASE CORP 5,469,000 4,937,000 1 1 3
CATERPILLAR, INC. 16,830,000 15,451,000 1 3 3
CMI CORP 109,219 130,578 2 1 1
COMML. INTERTECH 459,856 621,836 3 3 3
CUMMINS ENGINE CO 3,056,000 5,245,000 2 1 1
CURTISS-WRIGHT 246,201 154,446 2 2
DEERE & COMPANY 13,847,400 10,290,000 3 6
DETROIT DIESEL CORP 1,045,100 2,087,100 2 1 7
ENVIRONMENTAL ELE . 45,234 77,923 2 1 3
GRACO, INC. 217,833 386,314 1 1 4
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COMPANY NAME TOTAL ASSETS 
(in Chous)
SALES 
(in Chous)
LOB FSSEGS MDASEGS
INGERSOLL-RAND CO. 5,563,300 5,729,000 2 3 3
KAYDON CORP 267,675 229,924 2 1 4
KENNAMETAL, INC. 781,609 983,873 2 1 3
LYDALL, INC. 158,072 252,128 4 1 1
MANITOWOC COMPANY 324,915 313,149 2 3 3
MET-PRO CORP 45,168 50,005 1 2
MIDDLEBY CORP 84,040 139,188 1 1 1
MONARCH 101,348 114,991 1 3 3
OSMONICS 125,058 111,610 2 1 1
NACCO IND., INC. 1,833,837 2,204,500 5 5 5
OUTBOARD MARINE 907,000 1,229,200 2 1
PARKER HANNIFIN 2,302,209 3,214,370 3 2 3
PORTEC, INC. 57,818 97,072 3 3 3
SELAS CORP OF AMER. 67,959 71,215 2 3 3
STANDEX INTL. CORP 342,701 569,293 4 3 3
L. S. STARRETT CO. 213,940 214,215 1 1 1
TIMKEN COMPANY 1,925,925 2,230,504 2 2 2
TORO COMPANY 468,315 932,853 1 1 3
CHEMICALS : 
AIRGAS, INC. 645,637 687,983 2 2 2
ALBERMARLE CORP 1,204,491 1,244,222 1 1 7
AMERICAN VANGUARD 40,928 45,098 2 1 1
CABOT CORP 1,654,333 1,830,393 5 2 2
CYTEC INDUSTRIES 1,293,800 1,260,100 1 1 3
DEXTER CORP 934,161 1,088,905 3 6 6
DIONEX CORP 131,780 120,024 1 1 6
EASTMAN CHEMICAL 4,854,000 5,040,000 1 2 9
E-Z-EM 76,095 97,597 2 2 2
GENERAL MAGNAPLATE 12,923 9,623 1 1 1
HAUSER CHEM. RSCH. 84,568 59,267 2 1 4
H. B. FULLER COMPANY 828,929 1,243,818 1 1 4
KINARK CORP 18,375 25,246 2 2
LEARONAL, INC. 122,682 177,004 1 1
LOCTITE CORP 715,628 785,148 1 1 3
MACDERMID, INC. 123,305 182,100 2 1
MORTON INTERNAT. 2,756,000 3,325,900 2 3 3
MY COGEN CORP 159,608 113,218 1 2 7
NALCO CHEMICAL CO 1,370,100 1,214,500 1 1 4
PENWEST, LTD. 186,760 174,200 3 1 1
PRAXAIR, INC. 4,134,000 3,146,000 2 1 1
QUAKER CHEMICAL 185,408 227,038 3 1 1
SEQUA CORP 1,621,978 1,414,139 5 4 4
STERLING CHEMICALS 609,939 1,030,198 1 2
SYNALLOY CORP 80,225 147,298 2 2
THIOKOL CORP 810,700 956,800 2 3 3
UNIVAR CORP 673,203 1,912,728 3 1 1
TRANSPORTATION :
ARVIN INDUSTRIES, INC 1,291,000 1,966,400 4 2 2
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COMPANY NAME TOTAL ASSETS 
(in Chous)
SALES 
(in chous1
LOB FSSEGS MDASEGS
ALLIED SIGNAL, INC. 12,465,000 14,346,000 3 3 3
CLARCOR, INC. 223,262 290,194 4 2 5
COLTEC INDUSTRIES 894,502 1,401,884 4 3 6
DANA CORP 5,110,800 5,563,300 3 3 5
EATON CORP 5,053,000 6,822,000 3 3 7
THE FAIRCHILD CORP 881,882 546,323 5 3 3
FEDERAL MOGAL CORP 1,714,400 1,995,900 4 1 3
FOUNTAIN POWERBOAT 16,334 38,727 2 1 1
GENCORP, INC. 1,458,000 1,772,000 5 3 3
HARLEY-DAVIDSON, INC 1,000,670 1,350,466 2 2
HARSCO CORP 1,310,662 1,495,466 5 3 3
HEICO CORP 47,401 40,379 2 2
NORTHRUP GRUMMAN 5,455,000 6,818,000 3 4 11
OEA, INC. 160,901 129,210 2
POLARIS INDUSTRIES 314,436 1,113,852 1 1 4
PS GROUP, INC. 305,971 167,004 3 3
ROHR, INC. 976,540 805,000 1 1 1
RPC, INC. 132,656 161,379 3 3 3
SUPERIOR INDUSTRIES 341,770 521,997 1 1
SUPREME INDUSTRIES 62,426 163,449 1 1 1
TELEFLEX, INC. 785,171 912,689 3 3 3
TEXTRON, INC. 23,172,000 6,468,000 6 6
THOR INDUSTRIES, INC. 148,460 562,681 1 2 2
TODD SHIPYARDS 110,924 69,096 3 1 2
TRINITY INDUSTRIES 1,420,000 2,314,900 5 6 6
UNITED TECH. CORP 15,958,000 22,802,000 3 5 5
TEXTILES :
BELDING HEMINWAY 94,124 88,654 2 2
CONE MILLS CORP 584,320 910,217 2 2 5
CROWN CRAFTS, INC. 134,031 210,963 3 1 3
CULP, INC. 194,999 308,026 1 1 3
DECORATOR INDUS. 16,415 34,207 1 1 1
DELTA WOODS I DE IND. 610,296 597,541 3 3
DIXIE YARNS, INC. 396,997 670,842 1
DYERSBURG CORP 188,872 199,413 1 1
FAB INDUSTRIES 161,027 182,000 1 1 1
FIELDCREST CANNON 812,946 1,095,193 1 1 4
FRUIT OF THE LOOM 2,919,500 2,403,100 1 1
GRIFFON CORP 285,616 546,359 4 3 3
GUILFORD MILLS, INC. 586,371 782,518 1 1 1
HANCOCK FABRICS 201,835 364,192 1 1
JOHNSTON INDUS. 255,101 263,327 1 1 1
PAXAR CORP 157,140 201,436 3 1 1
PILLOWTEX CORP 324,710 474,899 1 1 1
RUSSELL CORP 1,118,164 1,152,633 1 1 1
SHAW INDUSTRIES 1,662,783 2,869,828 1 1 1
SPRINGS INDUSTRIES 1,527,544 2,233,053 3 2 2
TEXFI INDUSTRIES 96,045 257,258 1 2 2
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C O M P A N Y  N AME T O T A L  A S S E T S  
(in chous)
SALES 
(in thous)
LOB F SSEGS MDASEGS
T H O M A S T O N  M I L L S , INC 186,323 276,490 1 I I
T U L T E X  C ORP 475,799 585,289 1 1 2
U N I T E D  M E R C H A N T S 58,428 59,493 1 1 1
W ORLDTEX, INC. 194,389 187,981 2 1 4
E L E C T ./E L E C T R O N I C  : 
A L P H A  INDUSTRIES 50,167 78,254 1 1 2
A M P , I N C . 4,=04,739 5,227,226 2 1
A R R O W  A U T O M O T I V E 5 9 , 0C5 106,574
AUGAT, INC. 407,476 534,373
B A L D O R  E L E CTRIC CO 313,462 4 ' 3 , 103 1
CAT.ALIMA L I GHTING 120,051 176,292 1
C O L E M A N  COMPANY 344,487 933,574 4
C TS C O R P O R A T I O N 227,127 300, 157 1
DEL E L E C T RONICS 39,054 32,596
E S P E Y  MEG 5 ELEC. 23,3 39 14,574
G E N E R A L  INSTRUMENT 2,300,'53 2,432,024 4
G E N E R A L  M I C R O W A V E 23,441 22,309 1
INTERl-LAGMETICS GEN. 103,'06 33,377 3 -,
LUKEHS, INC. 919,663 1,049, 153 3
LYNCH CORP. 302,439 338,166 6 3
M E R R I M A C  INDUSTRIES 15,138 14,396 1
N A T I O N A L  SERV I C E  IND 1, 131,345 1, 970, 627 : 3
O A K  INDUSTRIES, INC. 312,728 276,580 -i 3
P U B L I C K E R  INDUS. 45,190 66,290 3 :
R A Y C H E M  CORP 1, 454, ■’45 1, 5 3 0 , 5 7 3 3 4 d
R O G E R S  CORF 102,516 140,293 -,
S T A N D A R D  MOT O R 512,150 663,465 4
SL INDUSTRIES 62,156 91,125
T E C H / O P S  3E7C0N 12,931 22,4 31 z
T H O M A S  INDUSTRIES 313,533 4 9 0 , 5 7 3 z
T R W  , INC. 5,390,000 1 0 , 1'2,COO 4 3
V I S H A Y  INTERTECH. 1,543,331 1,224 , 4 16 : 1 L
■/ariable legend :
lCB--nuxber at lines of business in which the firm is engaged as denoted by 
if S M  codes assigned to the firm by the SEC at the two-digit level 
rSSEGS--r.imter if segments reported in formal, or full, segment reporting 
MEASEGS--numoer of segments reported in informal, or partial, segment repcr’
tne numcer
ir.g
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TABLE 2
Descriptive data for sample sales and 
total assets (in thousands of dollars) 
by industry
SALES
a Minimum Maximum Mean Std. dev.
FOOD 26 5. 023 17,719,000 2,888,075 4,115,072
MACE 30 50,005 15,451,000 2,045,685 3,435,103
CHEM 27 9,623 5,040,000 1,020,687 1,206,743
TRAN 27 38,727 22,802,000 2,986,604 5,102,366
TEX 25 34,207 2,869,828 678,196 757,915
ELEC 27 14,396 10,172,000 1,054,279 2,129,980
ALL FIRMS 162 5,023 22,802,000 1,790,604 3,292,000
TOTAL ASSETS
n Minimum Maxi mum Mean Std. dev.
FOOD 26 1, 545 12,431,000 2,151,005 3,071,362
MACH 30 45,168 16,830,000 1,980,799 3,934,599
CHEM 27 12,923 4,854,000 938,132 1,224,572
TRAN 27 16,334 23,172,000 2,993,006 5,552,463
TEX 25 16,415 2,919,500 529,751 661,062
ELEC 27 12,981 5,890,000 801,862 1,402,918
ALL FIRMS 162 1, 545 23,172,000 1,582,623 3,258,000
Industry legend:
FOOD--food and Itindred products manufacturing 
MACH--machinery manufacturing
CHEM--chemicals and allied products manufacturing 
TRAN--transportation equipment manufacturing 
TEX--textile mill products manufacturing
ELEC--electrical and electronic machinery, equipment and supplies manufacturing
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TABLE 3
Number of firms by Che number of different lines 
of business in which they are engaged
LOB PREQOENCY PERCENT CUMULATIVE PERCENT
1 60 37.0 37 . 0
2 51 31.5 68.5
3 25 15.4 84 . 0
4 16 9.9 93 .8
5 9 5.6 99.4
6 I .6 100 . 0
TOTAL 162 100.0
Variable legend:
LOB--lines of business as designated by the number of different two-digit SIC codes 
assigned to the firm by Che SEC
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TABLE 4
Segments reported in formal and informal segment reporting
Panel 1
Number of firms by how many segments are 
reported in formal financial statement 
segment reporting
FSSEGS FREQUENCY PERCENT CUMULATIVE PERCENT
1 91 56 .2 56 2
2 35 21.6 77.8
3 25 15 .4 93.2
4 5 3 . 1 96 . 3
5 2 1.2 97 . 5
6 4 2 . 5 100 . 0
TOTAL 162 100.0
Panel 2
Number of firms by how many segments 
are reported in partial segment reporting 
in areas of the annual report outside of 
the financial statements
MDASEGS FREQUENCY PERCENT CUMULATIVE PERCENT
1 49 30.2 30.2
2 32 19.8 50 . 0
3 39 24 .1 74 . 1
4 17 10.5 84 .6
5 8 4 . 9 89 . 5
6 7 4 . 3 93 . 8
7 7 4 . 3 98 . 1
8 1 .6 98 . 8
9 1 .6 99 .4
11 1 .6 100 . 0
TOTAL 162 100.0
Variable legend:
FSSEGS--number of segments reported in formal, or full, segment reporting 
MDASEGS--number of segments reported in informal, or partial, segment reporting
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Table 4 (continued)
Panel 3
Cross-tabulâtion of firms by how many segments are 
reported in formal segment reporting by how many 
segments are reported in informal segment reporting
MDASEGS 1 2
FSSEGS 
3 4 5 6 TOTAL
1 49 49
2 6 26 32
3 14 3 22 39
4 12 1 4 17
5 3 2 1 2 8
6 2 1 4 7
7 4 2 1 7
8 1 1
9 1 1
11 1 1
TOTAL 91 35 25 5 2 4 162
Variable legend:
FSSEGS--number of segments reported in formal, or full, segment reporting 
MDASEGS--number of segments reported in informal, or partial, segment reporting
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TABLE 5
Segtnencs reported vs lines of business 
Pane 1 1
Cross-tabulâtion for segments reported in full, formal 
segment reporting by the number of lines of business
LOB 1 2
FSSEGS
3 4 5 6 TOTAL
1 49 9 2 60
2 29 16 5 1 51
3 9 4 7 2 1 2 25
4 4 5 6 1 16
5 1 4 1 1 2 9
6 1 1
TOTAL 91 35 25 5 2 4 162
Panel 2
Cross - tabulation for segments reported in partial, informal 
segment reporting by the number of lines of business
LOB 1 2 3 4
MDASEGS 
5 6 7 8 9 11 TOTAL
1 27 9 10 6 2 1 3 1 1 60
2 16 16 8 6 1 1 3 51
3 5 3 8 3 2 2 1 1 25
4 1 3 8 1 2 1 16
5 1 4 1 1 2 9
6 1 1
TOTAL 49 32 39 17 8 7 7 1 1 1 162
Legend :
LOB--Number of lines of business designated by the two-digit SIC code 
FSSEGS--Number of segments reported in the formal, full segment reporting 
MDASEGS--Number of segments reported in the informal, partial segment reporting
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TABLE 6
Segmenc reporting by industry 
Panel A
Mean, number of observations and standard deviations 
for actual formal and informal segments reported and 
formal and informal segment reporting levels by industry
Industry LEVELI LEVELII FSSEGS MDASEGS
FOOD mean .8750 1.9327 1.3077 2.9231
n 26 26 26 26
std dev .4355 1.6139 .8376 2.1526
MACH mean .9167 1.6333 2 .000 2.9333
n 28 30 30 30
std dev .4530 1.0354 1.2865 1.6174
CHEM mean 1.0074 2.1185 1.7407 3.1481
n 27 27 27 27
std dev . 5274 1.8806 1.1633 2.1609
TRAN mean .8993 1.2577 2 .5926 3.5185
n 27 27 27 27
std dev . 3909 .8741 1.4212 2.2765
TEX mean .9133 1.2600 1.3600 1.9200
n 25 25 25 25
std dev .4051 . 8163 .6377 1.1874
ELEC mean . 8062 1.1981 1.6667 2.4074
n 27 27 27 27
std dev .3591 .7661 . 8321 1.3661
ALL FIRMS mean .9031 1.5695 1.7901 2.8210
n 160 162 162 162
std dev .4297 1.2701 1.1444 1.8846
Pane1 B
Results of ANOVA performed by industry 
on formal and informal segments reported and 
and informal segment reporting levels
formal
ANOVA BY INDUSTRY
Variable df ANOVA sum of 
squares
Mean square F Signif. 
Level
LEVELI 5 1.159 .232 .981 .431
LEVELII 5 32.200 6 . 440 2 .997 . 013
FSSEGS 5 29.862 5.972 5 .147 . 000
MDASEGS 5 41.589 8.318 2 .447 .036
Legend :
LEVELI--segments reported in formal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
LEVELII--segments reported in informal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
FSSEGS--number of segments reported in formal segment reporting 
MDASEGS--number of segments reported in informal segment reporting
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TABLE 7
Correlation of firm size and segment reporting levels
PANEL A
Pearson correlations, significance levels and number of observations 
for the segment reporting level variables, LEVELI and LEVELII, and firm 
size represented by total assets, TASSETS
LEVELI LEVELII TASSETS
LEVELI I.000
162
LEVELII .413 1.000
.000
162 162
TASSETS .296 . 124 1. 000
.000 . 117
162 162 162
PANEL B
Pearson correlations, significance levels and number of observations 
for the segment reporting variables, LEVELI and LEVELII, and firm size, 
reprsented by total assets, TASSETS, after removal of two firms from the LEVELI pool
LEVELI LEVELII TASSETS
LEVELI 1.000
160
LEVELII .418 1.000
.000
160 162
TASSETS . 146 . 124 1. 000
. 066 . 117
160 162 162
Variable legend;
LEVELI--segments reported in formal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
LEVELII--segments reported in informal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
TASSETS--Firm total assets
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TABLE 8
Pearson correlations, significance level and number of observations for effects considered
in hypotheses 1-7 across all sample firms
LEVELI LEVELII BONDS DEFBEN DIRSTK DIVINC EXCOMP GROWTH
LEVELI 1.000
160
LEVELII .438 1. 000
. 000
160 162
BONDS . 095 . 017 1. 000
.231 .833
160 162 162
DEFBEN . 076 . 059 .147 1.000
. 341 . 458 .061
160 162 162 162
DIRSTK - .250 - .277 - .206 - .261 1. 000
.002 . 000 .009 . 001
158 160 160 160 160
DIVINC . 076 . 124 - . 135 . 143 - .247 1. 000
. 338 . 117 .087 . 069 .002
160 162 162 162 160 162
EXCOMP .069 .272 .081 . 188 - .289 .078 1.000
.412 . 001 .333 . 024 . 000 .351
143 145 145 145 145 145 145
GROWTH .037 , 118 - .218 - .320 . 182 - . 057 . 019 1.000
. 648 . 136 . 006 .000 . 022 .477 . 825
158 160 160 160 158 160 143 160
PP&E . 060 . 032 .014 . 087 - . 010 . 106 - . 076 - . 187
. 448 . 685 .860 .270 . 901 . 181 . 365 .018
160 162 162 162 160 162 145 160
PRVDBT - . 035 - . 040 . 081 . 065 . 049 - .241 - . 003 - . 025
. 660 .609 .305 .413 . 537 . 002 . 972 .753
160 162 162 162 160 162 145 160
R&D - .052 . 177 - .154 - .200 .047 - . 145 . 043 . 196
. 624 . 092 . 143 .056 .662 . 168 .707 .063
90 92 92 92 90 92 80 91
STKREP . 004 . 123 - . 076 - . 122 -.080 . 054 . 002 - . 072
. 958 .118 .339 . 121 .315 .497 . 981 . 366
160 162 162 162 160 162 145 160
Variable legend:
LEVELI--segments reported in formal segment reporting divided by lines of business
LEVELII--segments reported in informal segment reporting divided by lines of business
BONDS--amount of debt from public sources divided by total assets
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting the presence of a defined benefit plan
DIRSTK--percentage of stock outstanding held or controlled by officers and directors
DIVINC--dummy variable denoting increases in dividends per share over the sample period
EXCOMP--percentage of executive compensation that is stock-based
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from period 1991 through 1995
PP&E--plant, property and equipment, at cost, divided by total assets
PRVDBT--total liabilities provided by private sources divided by total assets
R&D--expenditures on research and development divided by total assets
STKREP--amount expended to repurchase stock outstanding divided by total assets
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TABLE 8 (concinued)
PP&E PRVDBT R&D STKREP
LBVELI
LEVELII
BONDS
DEFBEN
DIRSTK
DIVINC
EXCOHF
GROWTH
PP&E 1.000
162
PRVDBT - . 301 
. 000 
162
1. 000 
162
R&D - .047 
. 660 
92
- . 049 
. 643 
92
1.000
92
STKREP - .059 
.456 
162
- .153 
.051 
162
. 080 
.448 
92
1.000
162
92
TABLE 9
Models estimated to explain the level of formal segment reporting across all sample firms
Dependent variable: LEVELI Hypothesized sign precedes variable name
Bo -c BONDS -DEFBEN -DIRSTK -DIVINC mEXCOMP ♦GROWTH
MODEL 1:
B 1. 097 - . 518 - . 120 - .595 .026 . 124 .209
t 4.473 -1.075 -.831 -1.943 .247 . 594 .436
sig. . 000 .286 .409 .056 .806 . 554 . 664
MODEL 2 :
B .715 . 057 . 066 - .493 . 064 - . 014 . 763
t 5.226 . 158 .793 -2.476 .909 - . 092 2.313
sig. .000 .874 .429 .015 .365 .927 . 022
MODEL 3 :
B .857 .018 - . 571 .032 .413
t 7. 384 .230 -3.026 .459 1.273
sig. .000 .818 . 003 .647 . 205
MODEL 4:
B .917 . 368 - .527 .057 . 390
t 12.446 1. 047 -2.791 .810 1.253
sig. .000 . 297 . 006 .419 .212
MODEL 5:
B .930 - .564 - . Oil . 592
t 13.691 -3.006 - . 076 1.953
sig. .000 .003 . 939 . 053
+PP&E -PRVDBT ♦ R&D -STKREP n P Adj. R'
MODEL 1: 
B 
t
sig.
. 020 
.099 
. 922
- . 392
- . 989 
. 326
-.982 
- . 543 
. 589
- .693
- . 560 
. 577
77 .792 - . 025
MODEL 2 : 
B 
t
sig.
. 168 
1. 374 
. 172
- . 189
- . 188 
. 852
141 1.975 . 053
MODEL 3 : 
B 
t
sig.
. 128 
1. Ill 
.268
156 2 . 533 . 047
MODEL 4 : 
B 
t
sig.
156 3 . 125 . 052
MODEL 5: 
B 
t
sig.
141 3 .849 . 058
Variable legend:
LEVELI--segments reported in formal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
BONDS--debt from public sources divided by total assets
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting existence of a defined benefit pension plan
DIRSTK--percentage of outstanding stock owned or controlled by officers and directors
DIVINC--dummy variable denoting increases in dividends per share over period 1991 to 1995
EXCOMP--percentage of executive compensation that is stock-based
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from 1991 through 1995
PP&E--plant, property and equipment divided by total assets
PRVDBT--debt from private sources divided by total assets
R&D-- research and development expense divided by total assets
STKREP--treasury stock expenditures divided by total assets
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TABLE 10
Models escimaced co explain the level of informal segment reporting across all f 1 rms
Dependent variable: LEVELII Hypothesized sign precedes variable name
B, +BONDS -DEFBEN -DIRSTK -DIVINC fEXCOMP ■►GROWTH
MODEL 1: 
B 
t
sig.
.863 
1. Ill 
.270
- . 855
- . 557 
. 579
- . 189
- .412 
.682
-1.915 
-1.970 
. 053
.452 
1.342 
. 184
1.559 
2.340 
. 022
1.418 
. 931 
.355
MODEL 2 : 
B 
t
sig.
1.246 
4 . 932 
. 000
-1.519 
-2.483 
. 014
.213
.983
.327
1.126 
2 .453 
. 015
2 .020 
2 . 102 
. 037
MODEL 3 : 
B 
t
sig.
1.364
6.133
.000
-1.663
-2.803
.006
1.125 
2.451 
. 016
2 . 029 
2 .112 
. 036
MODEL 4 : 
B 
t
sig.
1.051 
2.951 
. 004
-1.652 
-2.787 
. 006
1. 170 
2.542 
. 012
2 . 244 
2.293 
. 023
MODEL 5: 
B 
t
sig.
1.457 
6 .742 
. 000
-1.736 
-2.917 
. 004
1.107 
2 .398 
. 018
■►PP6E -PRVDBT +R&D -STKREP n F Adj. R'
MODEL 1; 
B 
t
Sig.
. 360 
. 569 
. 571
.262 
. 957 
.340
7.561 
1.313 
. 194
4 .688 
1.190 
.238
79 2 .678 . 162
MODEL 2: 
B 
c
sig.
4 .954 
1. 593 
. 114
143 5.178 . 128
MODEL 3 : 
B 
t
sig.
5 .076 
1.634 
. 105
143 6.232 . 128
MODEL 4 : 
B 
t
sig.
. 422 
1. 122 
.264
5 . 317 
1.709 
.09
143 5.247 . 130
MODEL 5: 
B 
t
Sig.
143 7.332 . 118
Variable legend:
LEVELII--segments reported in informal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
BONDS--debt from public sources divided by total assets
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting existence of a defined benefit pension plan
DIRSTK--percentage of outstanding stock owned or controlled by officers and directors
DIVINC--dummy variable denoting increases in dividends per share over period 1991 to 1995
EXCOMP--percentage of executive compensation that is stock-based
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from 1991 through 1995
PP&E--plant, property and equipment divided by total assets
PRVDBT--debt from private sources divided by total assets
R&D--research and development expense divided by total assets
STKREP--treasury stock expenditures divided by total assets
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TABLE 8A
Pearson correlations, significance level and number of observations for effects considered 
in hypotheses 1-7 across all sample firms operating in more than one line of business
LEVELI LEVELII BONDS DEPBEN DIRSTK DIVINC EXCOMP GROWTH
LEVELI 1. 00
101
LEVELII . 327 1.00
.001
101 102
BONDS . 070 - .007 1.00
. 488 . 946
101 102 102
DEFBEN .228 .247 .157 1.00
.022 .012 . 114
101 102 102 102
DIRSTK - . 354 - .330 - .139 - . 379 1.00
.000 .001 . 165 .000
100 101 101 101 101
DIVINC .174 .077 - .119 .204 - . 349 1.00
. 082 . 441 .232 .039 .000
101 102 102 102 101 102
EXCOMP . 138 . 090 . 062 .292 - . 314 . 155 1.00
. 195 . 399 .557 .005 .002 . 143
90 91 91 91 91 91 91
GROWTH - . 151 . 023 - . 124 - . 345 .084 . 062 . 068 1 . 00
. 134 . 823 . 217 .000 .403 . 536 . 524
100 101 101 101 100 101 90 101
PP&E . 018 . 023 - .018 . 119 .028 .089 - . 141 - . 171
. 862 . 821 . 861 .234 .785 . 372 . 181 . 087
101 102 102 102 101 102 91 101
PRVDBT . 017 - . 052 - .064 - . 033 . 069 - .223 - . 002 - . 058
. 869 .605 . 520 .741 .496 . 024 . 986 . 562
101 102 102 102 101 102 91 101
R&D - . 049 .204 - . 164 - .053 .065 -.109 .013 - .066
. 714 . 122 .214 .692 .627 .412 .928 .617
58 59 59 59 58 59 51 59
STKREP - . 022 - .063 - . 047 . 012 - .013 - . 022 - .023 - . 061
.825 . 527 .639 . 901 .896 .827 .828 . 543
101 102 102 102 101 102 91 101
Variable legend:
LEVELI--segments reported in formal segment reporting divided by lines of business
LEVELII--segments reported in informal segment reporting divided by lines of business
BONDS--amount of debt from public sources divided by total assets
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting the presence of a defined benefit plan
DIRSTK--percentage of stock outstanding held or controlled by officers and directors
DIVINC--dummy variable denoting increases in dividends per share over the sample period
EXCOMP--percentage of executive compensation that is stock-based
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from period 1991 through 1995
PP&E--plant, property and equipment, at cost, divided by total assets
PRVDBT--total liabilities provided by private sources divided by total assets
R&D--expenditures on research and development divided by total assets
STKREP--amount expended co repurchase stock outstanding divided by total assets
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TABLE 8A (concinued)
PP&E PRVDBT R&D STKREP
LBVELI
LEVELII
BONDS
DEEBEN
DIRSTK
DIVINC
EXCOMP
GROWTH
PP&E 1. 00 
102
PRVDBT - .317 
. 001 
102
1.00
102
R&D . 015 
. 909 
59
- . 068 
. 609 
59
1.00
59
STKREP - .029 
. 774 
102
- . 087 
. 383 
102
.033
.803
59
1.00
102
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TABLE 9A
Models estimated to explain the level of formal segment reporting in multi-LOB firms
Dependent variable; LEVELI Hypothesized sign precedes variable name
Bo o-BONDS -DEFBEN -DIRSTK -DIVINC * EXCOMP +GROWTH
MODEL 1: 
B 
t
sig.
1.480 
3 .855 
. 000
- .652 
-.1354 
. 183
- .216 
-1.204 
.236
- .675 
-1.888 
.067
.133
1.083
.285
. 328 
1. 173 
.248
-2.198 
-2.687 
,011
MODEL 2: 
B 
t
sig.
1. 321 
5.681 
. 000
- .783 
-1.831 
. 073
- .657 
-2.525 
. 015
-1.634 
-2.803 
. 007
MODEL 3 : 
B 
t
Sig.
1.360 
6.739 
. 000
- .716 
-1.680 
.099
- .615 
-2.398 
.020
-1.524 
-2.629 
.011
MODEL 4 : 
B 
t
sig.
.792 
8 . 917 
.000
. 100 
1.184 
.239
- . 603 
-3.030 
.003
MODEL 5: 
B 
t
sig.
. 924 
15.603 
. 000
- .677 
-3.547 
.001
- . 527 
-1.354 
. 179
+PP&E -PRVDBT +R&D -STKREP n P Adj. R'
MODEL 1: 
B 
t
sig.
- . 540 
-1.715 
. 094
. 194 
. 389 
. 700
- .696
- . 364 
.718
-1.295 
- .768 
.447
50 1.663 . 119
MODEL 2: 
B 
t
sig.
- . 381 
-1.696 
. 096
.265 
. 803 
.426
- .886 
- . 550 
. 585
-2.068 
-1.400 
. 168
57 2.712 . 176
MODEL 3 : 
B 
t
sig.
- . 357 
-1.584 
. 119
- .961
- . 594 
.555
57 3 .226 . 166
MODEL 4 : 
B 
t
sig.
100 7 .732 . 120
MODEL 5: 
B 
t
sig.
99 7.675 . 120
Variable legend:
LEVELI--segments reported in formal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
BONDS--debt from public sources divided by total assets
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting existence of a defined benefit pension plan
DIRSTK--percentage of outstanding stock owned or controlled by officers and directors
DIVINC--dummy variable denoting increases in dividends per share over period 1991 to 1995
EXCOMP--percentage of executive compensation that is stock-based
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from 1991 through 1995
PP&E--plant, property and equipment divided by total assets
PRVDBT--debt from private sources divided by total assets
R&D-- research and development expense divided by total assets
STKREP--treasury stock expenditures divided by total assets
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TABLE lOA
sciraaced to explain the level of informal segment reporting--multi-LOB firmsModels
Dependent variable; LEVELII Hypothesized sign precedes variable name
Bo +BONDS -DEFBEN -DIRSTK -DIVINC ♦ EXCOMP ♦GROWTH
MODEL 1: 
B 
t
Sig.
. 373 
. 520 
.606
- .242
- .271 
. 788
.502 
1.516 
. 137
-1.258 
-1.927 
. 061
. 267 
1.188 
.242
. 149 
.286 
. 776
.661
.450
.655
MODEL 2 : 
B 
t
sig.
. 444 
1.146 
.258
.423
1.547
.129
-1.133 
-1.897 
. 064
.277 
1. 346 
.185
.247
.511
.612
MODEL 3 : 
B 
t
sig .
1 . 177 
7.504 
. 000
-1.683 
-3.707 
.000
MODEL 4: 
B 
t
sig.
. 903 
3.064 
. 003
.208 
. 915 
.364
-1.375
-2.573
.013
.126 
.673 
. 504
MODEL 5: 
B 
t
sig.
1.131 
6. 587 
.000
.245 
1.499 
. 137
-1.026
-2.673
.009
♦PP&E -PRVDBT ♦R&D -STKREP n F Adj . R^
MODEL 1: 
B 
t
sig.
- . 142
- .249 
.905
.278 
. 328 
.745
9.142
2.574
.014
-1.834 
- .585 
.562
51 2 . 170 . 190
MODEL 2 : 
B 
t
sig.
9. 157 
2.807 
.007
-1.658 
- . 552 
. 584
51 3 .701 .245
MODEL 3 : 
B 
t
sig.
6.147 
2 . Ill 
.039
58 8.625 .211
MODEL 4: 
B 
t
sig.
6.458
2.188
.033
58 4 . 56 . 200
MODEL 5: 
B 
t
sig.
101 7.261 .111
Variable legend:
LEVELII--segments reported in informal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
BONDS--debt from public sources divided by total assets
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting existence of a defined benefit pension plan
DIRSTK--percentage of outstanding stock owned or controlled by officers and directors
DIVINC--dummy variable denoting increases in dividends per share over period 1991 to 1995
EXCOMP--percentage of executive compensation that is stock-based
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from 1991 through 1995
PP&E--plant, property and equipment divided by total assets
PRVDBT--debt from private sources divided by total assets
R&D-- research and development expense divided by total assets
STKREP-- treasury stock expenditures divided by total assets
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T A B L E  11 
Pane 1 A
Firms reporting research and development expense by industry
Industry
R&D Reporting
yea no Total firms
FOOD 5 21 26
MACH 25 5 30
CHEM 23 5 28
TRANS 17 10 27
TEX 2 23 25
ELEC 20 6 26
TOTALS 92 70 162
Panel B
Variable means comparison for firms who reported R&D and firms who 
did not report R&D
Variable Means - - R&D 
reporting
Means--no R&D 
reporting
Difference Significance
LEVELI . 933 .865 .068 . 323
LEVELII 1 . 744 1.340 .404 .045
BONDS . 055 . 049 .006 . 697
DIRSTK . 155 .223 - . 068 . 025
EXCOMP . 308 . 187 . 120 . 002
GROWTH . 101 .085 . 016 . 350
PP&E .625 .682 - . 057 .233
PRVDBT . 372 .469 - . 097 . 001
STKREP .017 . 010 . 007 . 189
Industry legend:
FOOD--food and kindred products manufacturing 
MACH--machinery manufacturing
CHEM--chemicals and allied products manufacturing 
TRAN--transportation equipment manufacturing 
TEX--textile mill products manufacturing
ELEC--electrical and electronic machinery, equipment and supplies manufacturingTABLE 7 
Variable legend:
LEVELII--segments reported in informal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
BONDS--debt from public sources divided by total assets
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting existence of a defined benefit pension plan
DIRSTK--percentage of outstanding stock owned or controlled by officers and directors
DIVINC--dummy variable denoting increases in dividends per share over period 1991 to 1995
EXCOMP--percentage of executive compensation chat is stock-based
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from 1991 through 1995
PP&E--plant, property and equipment divided by total assets
PRVDBT--debt from private sources divided by total assets
R&D-- research and development expense divided by total assets
STKREP--treasury stock expenditures divided by total assets
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TABLE 12
Pearson correlations, significance levels, and number of obseir/ations
for effects considered in hypotheses 1-7 across sample firms
within the food and kindred products industry
LEVELI LEVELII BONDS DEFBEN DIRSTK DIVINC EXCOMP GROWTH
LEVELI 1.000
26
LEVELII . 447 1.000
. 022
26 26
BONDS . 514 . 069 1.000
. 007 .738
26 26 26
DEFBEN . 371 .280 .491 1.000
. 062 . 166 .011
26 26 26 26
DIRSTK - .494 - .276 - .466 - .315 1.000
. 010 . 173 .016 . 117
26 26 26 26 26
DIVINC .211 . 121 .226 .187 - .445 1.000
. 301 . 557 .267 . 360 . 02 3
26 26 26 26 26 26
EXCOMP .280 .675 .202 .306 - .330 .251 1.000
. 184 .000 .345 .147 . 115 .237
24 24 24 24 24 24 24
GROWTH - . 102 . 018 - .257 . 039 . 411 - . 183 - .332 1 . 000
. 634 . 934 .225 .856 . 046 . 391 . 131
24 24 24 24 24 24 22 24
PP&E - .090 - . 119 - .113 - .205 - .054 .231 - . 19) - . 196
.663 .562 .583 .316 . 794 .257 . 351 . 359
26 26 26 26 26 26 24 24
PRVDBT - . 013 . 089 - .042 . 083 - . 121 - .401 . 091 - . 089
. 949 .667 .840 .686 . 555 .042 . 671 . 677
26 26 26 26 26 26 24 24
R&D - . 572 - . 584 .601 - .643 -.696 . 805
.314 .301 .283 - .241 . 192 . 195
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4
STKREP . 300 .137 .461 - .018 -.359 . 303 . 042 - . 162
. 137 .505 .018 . 931 . 072 . 132 .829 .451
26 26 26 26 26 26 24 24
Variable legend:
LEVELI--segments reported in formal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
LEVELII--segments reported in informal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
BONDS--amount of debt from public sources divided by total assets 
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting the presence of a defined benefit plan 
DIRSTK--percentage of stock outstanding held by officers and directors
DIVINC--dummy variable denoting increases in dividends per share over the sample period
EXCOMP--percentage of executive compensation that is stock-based
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from period 1991 through 1995
PP&E--plant, property and equipment, at cost, divided by total assets
PRVDBT- - total liabilities provided by private sources divided by total assets
R&D--expenditures on research and development divided by total assets
STKREP--amount expended to repurchase stock outstanding divided by total assets
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TABLE 12 (concinued)
PP&E PRVDBT R&D STKREP
LEVELI
LEVELII
BONDS
DEFBEN
DIRSTK
DIVINC
EXCOMP
GROWTH
PP&E 1. 000 
26
PRVDBT - . 536 
. 005 
26
1.000
26
R&D - . 748 
. 146 
5
-.086
.891
5
1.000
5
STKREP . 149 
.466 
26
- . 168 
.413 
26
- . 319 
.601 
5
1. 000 
26
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TABLE 13
Models estimated to explain the level of formal segment reporting across
sample firms within the food and kindred products manufacturing industry
Dependent variable: LEVELI Hypothesized signs below variable names
Bo BONDS DIRSTK DEFBEN GROWTH DIVINC EXCOM n Adj
+ - - + - + P R2
MODEL 1:
B . 913 2 .122 - .865 .023 .590 . 021 24 .216
t 4 . 04 3 1. 587 -1.728 . 110 .746 . 012 2 .26
sig. . 001 . 130 . 101 .913 .465 . 991
MODEL 2:
B . 822 .833 - . 950 . 078 . 893 . 328 22 . 195
t 4 .336 . 589 -2.189 . 384 1.173 . 889 2 .01
Sig. . 001 . 564 . 044 .706 .258 . 387
MODEL 3 :
B . 927 2 .191 - . 877 .612 24 .2 94
t 6 .093 1.953 -1.965 .844 4 .19
sig. . 000 . 065 . 063 .409
MODEL 4:
B .929 2.077 - .638 26 .290
t 6 . 324 1.903 -1.707 6 .11
sig. . 000 .070 . 101
MODEL 5 :
B . 939 - .822 .214 26 .234
t 5.287 -2.270 1.295 4 .82
sig. . 000 .033 .208
Variable legend:
LEVELI--segments reported in formal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
BONDS--amount of debt from public sources divided by total assets 
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting the presence of a defined benefit plan 
DIRSTK--percentage of stock outstanding held by officers and directors 
DIVINC--dummy variable denoting increases in dividends per share over the period 1991 
through 1995
EXCOM--percentage of executive compensation that is stock-based 
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from period 1991 through 1995
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TABLE 14
Models estimated to explain the level of informal segment reporting
across firms within the food and kindred products manufacturing industry
Dependent variable: LEVELII Hypothesized signs below variable names
B, DIRSTK DEFBEN EXCOMP
+
n F Adj
R2
MODEL 1:
B 1. 120 - . 382 4.689 24 8 . 884 . 407
t 2 .114 - . 303 3.869
sig. . 047 .765 . 001
MODEL 2:
B . 999 4 .810 24 18.438 .431
t 2 .921 4.294
sig. . 008 .000
MODEL 3:
B .886 .210 4.678 24 8 . 918 .408
t 1.881 .359 3.897
Sig. . 074 .723 . 001
Variable legend:
LEVELII--segments reported in informal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting the presence of a defined benefit plan 
DIRSTK--percentage of stock outstanding held by officers and directors 
EXCOMP--percentage of executive compensation that is stock-based
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TABLE 15
Pearson correlations, significance level and number of observations
for effects considered in hypotheses 1-7 across sample firms
within the machinery manufacturing industry
LEVELI LEVELII BONDS DEFBEN DIRSTK DIVINC EXCOMP GROWTH
LEVELI 1.000
28
LEVELII .233 1. 000
.232
28 30
BONDS - . 137 - . 027 1.000
.489 .886
28 30 30
DEFBEN . 153 - . 141 - . 128 1.000
.437 .456 . 501
28 30 30 30
DIRSTK - .220 - .280 - .251 - . 537 1.000
.270 . 141 . 189 .003
27 29 29 29 29
DIVINC .000 . 140 - .026 - . 026 - .072 1.000
1.000 .461 .890 .891 .711
28 30 30 30 29 30
EXCOMP - . 081 .247 . 075 .214 - .408 .480 1.000
.702 .214 .711 .284 . 035 . Oil
25 27 27 27 27 27 27
GROWTH - .248 - . 139 - . 149 - . 127 .098 . 348 . 045 1. 000
.203 . 463 .433 . 505 .613 . 059 . 825
28 30 30 30 29 30 27 30
PP&E - .097 - . 138 . 167 .075 - .079 - . 005 - . 100 - . 120
.622 .469 . 377 .695 .685 . 980 . 621 . 529
28 30 30 30 29 30 27 30
PRVDBT . 080 . 158 - .284 . 114 . 133 - . 096 . 088 . 001
.688 . 403 . 129 . 549 .493 . 614 . 663 . 995
28 30 30 30 29 30 27 30
R&D - .417 . 325 . 140 - . 507 . 101 - . 081 - . 042 . 020
.048 . 113 . 504 . 010 . 639 . 702 . 852 . 926
23 25 25 25 24 25 22 25
STKREP - .091 . 175 . 010 - .132 - .157 - .208 . 000 - . 109
.646 .355 . 958 .485 .416 .270 . 999 . 567
28 30 30 30 29 30 27 30
Variable legend:
LEVELI--segments reported in formal segment reporting divided by lines of business
LEVELII--segments reported in informal segment reporting divided by lines of business
BONDS--amount of debt from public sources divided by total assets
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting the existence of a defined benefit pension plan
DIRSTK--percentage of stock outstanding held or controlled by officers and directors
DIVINC--dummy variaible denoting increases in dividends per share over the sample period
EXCOMP--percentage of executive compensation that is stock-based
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from period 1991 through 1995
PP&E--plant, property and equipment, at cost, divided by total assets
PRVDBT--total liabilities provided by private sources divided by total assets
R&D--expenditures on research and development divided by total assets
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S T K R E P  - -amount: e x p e n d e d  Co r e p u r c h a s e  o u t s c a n d i n g  scoclt d i v i d e d  by total ass e t s
T A B L E  15 (continued)
PP&E PRVDBT R&D STKREP
LEVELI
LEVELII
BONDS
DEFBEN
DIRSTK
DIVINC
EXCOMP
GROWTH
PP&E 1.000
30
PRVDBT - . 505 
. 004 
30
1. 000 
30
R&D . 033 
. 877 
25
- . 124 
.554 
25
1.000
25
STKREP
- -  .
. 021 
.913 
30
- . 021 
.911 
30
.050
.812
25
1.000
30
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TABLE 16
Models estimated to explain the level of formal segment reporting
across sample firms within the machinery manufacturing industry
Dependent variable: LBVELI Hypothesized signs below variable names
Bo GROWTH R&D DIRSTK PRVDBT PP&E n
7
Adj
R2
MODEL 1: 
B 
t
sig.
1.367 
2.857 
. Oil
-3.649 
-2.313 
. 034
-5.388
-1.689
.111
- .200 
- . 327 
.748
.764 
1. 371 
. 189
- . 365
- .779 
.447
22
2.55
.270
MODEL 2: 
B 
t
Sig.
1.057 
4 . 021 
. 001
-3 .423 
-2.233 
. 039
-5.173 
-1.647 
. 118
- .232 
-.386 
.705
. 946 
1.892 
. 076
22
3.108
. 286
MODEL 3 : 
B 
t
Sig.
.888 
3 . 191 
. 005
-5.370 
-1.548 
.139
- .700 
-1.124 
.276
.779 
1.425 
. 171
22 
2 .031
. 128
MODEL 4 : 
B 
t
Sig.
1.274 
4 .491 
.000
-3 .558 
-2.186 
.042
-7.225 
-2.093 
.050
.661 
1.195 
.247
22 
3 . 513
. 255
Variable legend:
LEVELI--segments reported in formal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
DIRSTK--percentage of stock outstanding held by officers and directors 
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from period 1991 through 1995 
PP&E--plant, property and equipment, at cost, divided by total assets 
PRVDBT--total liabilities provided by private sources divided by total assets 
R&D--expenditures on research and development divided by total assets
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TABLE 17
Models estimated to explain the level of informal segment reporting
across sample firms within the machinery manufacturing industry
Dependent variable: LEVELII Hypothesized signs are below variable names
Bo DEFBEN DIVINC DIRSTK EXCOMP
+
GROWTH R&D n
P
Adj
R2
MODEL 1 :
a
t
sig.
2.491
1.879
.080
- .808 
- .888 
. 389
. 658 
1.071 
. 301
-4.013 
-1.740 
.102
- . 138
- .075 
. 941
-2.935 
- .634 
.535
11.237 
. 975 
. 345
22 
1. 571
. 140
MODEL 2 : 
B 
t
sig.
3 .281 
3 .719 
.001
-1.262 
-1.940 
.066
.443
.897
.380
-3.522 
-1.998 
.059
.400
.256
.800
-4.841
-1.292
.210
27
1.744
. 125
MODEL 3 : 
B 
t
Sig.
3 .408
4 . 519 
.000
-1.296 
-2.063 
. 050
-3.756 
-2.385 
.025
-2.615 
- .808 
.427
29 
2. 395
. 130
MODEL 4: 
B 
t
sig.
3 . 150
4 .641 
. 000
-1.252 
-2.014 
. 054
-3.803 
-2.433 
.022
29 
3 .311
. 142
MODEL 5: 
B 
t
sig.
2 .677 
2 .453 
.023
-.956 
-1.173 
.255
-4.410 
-2.318 
.031
10.222 
1. 035 
.313
24
2.983
. 205
Variable legend:
LEVELII--segments reported in informal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting the presence of a defined benefit plan 
DIRSTK--percentage of stock outstanding held by officers and directors 
DIVINC--dummy variable denoting increases in dividends per share over the period 1991 
through 19 95
EXCOMP--percentage of executive compensation that is stock-based 
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from period 1991 through 1995 
R&D--expenditure on research and development divided by total assets
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TABLE 18
Pearson correlations, significance levels and number of observations
for effects considered in hypotheses 1-7 across firms
within the chemicals and allied products manufacturing industry
LEVELI LEVELII BONDS DEFBEN DIRSTK DIVINC EXCOMP GROWTH
LEVELI 1.000
27
LEVELII . 582 1.000
.001
27 27
BONDS . 078 .058 1.000
. 700 . 774
27 27 27
DEFBEN . 010 - .061 .349 1.000
.960 .762 . 075
27 27 27 27
DIRSTK - . 347 - .456 - . 135 - .402 1.000
. 083 . 019 . 512 . 042
26 26 26 26 26
DIVINC . 020 . 108 . 257 .210 - . 381 1. 000
.923 . 591 . 195 .294 .055
27 27 27 27 26 27
EXCOMP .245 . 397 - .272 - .205 - .221 - .215 1. 000
.249 . 054 . 199 .335 .300 .313
24 24 24 24 24 24 24
GROWTH .244 .429 - . 195 - .468 - . 108 - .268 .358 1 . 000
.220 . 025 . 329 . 014 .598 . 177 . 086
27 27 27 27 26 27 24 27
PP&E . 156 . 072 . 101 .464 - . 161 . 101 - . 192 - . 355
.436 .722 .616 . 015 .432 .618 . 369 . 069
27 27 27 27 26 27 24 27
PRVDBT - . 270 - . 304 - .047 .359 . 114 - . 207 - . 141 - . 151
. 173 . 123 . 816 .066 . 578 . 300 . 510 . 452
27 27 27 27 26 27 24 27
R&D . 106 . 198 - .338 - .438 .387 - . 514 .325 . 505
.639 .376 . 124 . 041 .083 . 014 . 163 . 017
22 22 22 22 21 22 20 22
STKREP - . 129 .163 - . 177 - .075 - . 083 - . 033 . 069 - . 100
. 520 .417 . 377 .708 .688 .871 . 748 . 618
27 27 27 27 26 27 24 27
Variable legend;
LEVEL!--segments reported in formal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
LEVELII--segments reported in informal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
BONDS --amount of debt from public sources divided by total assets 
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting the presence of a defined benefit plan 
DIRSTK--percentage of stock outstanding held by officers and directors
DIVINC--dummy variable denoting increases in dividends per share over the sample period
EXCOMP--percentage of executive compensation that is stock-based
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from period 1991 through 1995
PP&E--plant, property and equipment, at cost, divided by total assets
PRVDBT--total liabilities provided by private sources divided by total assets
R&D--expenditures on research and development divided by total assets
STKREP--amount expended to repurchase stock outstanding divided by total assets
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TABLE 18 (continued)
PP&E PRVDBT R&D STKREP
LEVELI
LEVELII
BONDS
DEFBEN
DIRSTK
DIVINC
EXCOMP
GROWTH
PP&E 1.000
27
PRVDBT . 028 
. 890 
27
1. 000 
27
R&D - .244 
.274 
22
. 180 
.422 
22
1.000
22
STKREP - . 233 
.242 
27
. 023 
. 910 
27
.217
.333
22
1.000
27
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TABLE 19
Models estimated to explain the level of formal segment reporting
across sample firms within the chemicals and allied products manufacturing industry
Dependent variable ; LEVELI Hypothesized signs are below variable names
Bo DIRSTK PRVDBT R&D GROWTH n P Adj
R2
MODEL 1: 
B 
t
Sig.
1.336 
4 . 767 
.000
-1.315 
-2.231 
.039
-1.074
-1.327
.202
5 .200 
1.712 
. 105
21 2.661 . 199
MODEL 2: 
B 
t
sig.
1. 359 
5.053 
. 000
-.842
-1.581
.128
- .716 
-1.097 
.284
.587
.854
.402
26 1.850 . 093
MODEL 3 : 
B 
t
sig.
1.457 
6.018 
. 000
-.884 
-1.678 
. 107
- .793 
-1.235 
.229
26 2.439 . 103
MODEL 4; 
B 
t
sig.
1.036 
6 . 106 
. 000
-1.403 
-2.348 
.031
4 .715 
1.531 
. 143
21 2.984 . 166
Variable legend:
LEVELI--segments reported in formal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
DIRSTK--percentage of stock outstanding held by officers and directors 
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from period 1991 through 1995 
PRVDBT--total liabilities provided by private sources divided by total assets 
R&D--expenditures on research and development divided by total assets
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TABLE 20
Models escimaced to explain the level of Informal segment reporting
across sample firms within the chemicals and allied products manufacturing industry
Dependent variable: LEVELII Hypothesized signs are below variable names
B, DIRSTK EXCOMP GROWTH PRVDBT DEFBEN n
F
Adj
R2
MODEL 1: 
B 
t
sig.
3 .298 
3.186 
.005
-3.481
-1.852
.080
1.352 
.911 
. 374
4.548
1.864
.078
-3.719 
-1.531 
. 142
24 
4 . 185
. 356
MODEL 2: 
B 
t
sig.
3 .252 
3.820 
. 001
-3.952 
-2.345 
. 028
4.476 
2.059 
. 052
-2.525
-1.223
.234
26
4.687
.307
MODEL 3 : 
B 
t
sig.
2 .420 
4 . 681 
. 000
-4.158 
-2.453 
.022
4 . 344
2 .226 
.036
26
6.151
. 292
MODEL 4 : 
B 
t
sig.
3 . 885 
4,906 
.000
-5.618
-2.875
.009
-1.014 
-1.338 
. 194
26 
4 . 153
.201
Variable legend:
LEVELII--segments reported in informal segment reporting divided by lines of business
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting the presence of a defined benefit plan
DIRSTK--percentage of stock outstanding held by officers and directors
EXCOMP--percentage of executive compensation that is stock-based
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from period 1991 through 1995
PRVDBT--total liabilities provided by private sources divided by total assets
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TABLE 21
Pearson correlations, significance levels and number of observations
for effects considered in hypotheses 1-7 across sample firms
within the transportation equipment manufacturing industry
LEVELI LEVELII BONDS DEPBEN DIRSTK DIVINC EXCOMP GROWTH
LBVELI 1.000
27
LEVELII . 513 1. 000
.006
27 27
BONDS - . 183 - .055 1.000
. 360 .787
27 27 27
DEFBEN .019 - .017 .290 1.000
. 925 .935 . 143
27 27 27 27
DIRSTK - . 005 -.217 - . 140 - . 376 1.000
. 979 .278 . 485 . 053
27 27 27 27 27
DIVINC .208 . 157 - . 325 . 105 - .414 1.000
.297 .435 . 098 .603 .032
27 27 27 27 27 27
EXCOMP - .053 . 151 .283 .447 - .561 . 193 1. 000
.806 .483 . 180 .028 .004 .365
24 24 24 24 24 24 24
GROWTH .352 .399 - .410 - . 538 . 353 . 186 - . 334 1. 000
. 072 .039 - .034 .004 . 071 . 353 . 110
27 27 27 27 27 27 24 27
PP&E - .332 - .336 -.028 .024 .234 -.139 - . 158 - .207
.091 .087 .890 . 905 .241 .490 . 462 . 301
27 27 27 27 27 27 24 27
PRVDBT .008 .218 .085 - . 007 - .045 - . 125 .304 .203
. 969 .276 . 672 .822 .822 . 534 . 148 . 309
27 27 27 27 27 27 24 27
R&D .280 .680 - . 180 - . 049 - . 375 .449 .441 .291
.276 . 003 .489 .851 . 138 . 071 . 115 .258
17 17 17 17 17 17 14 17
STKREP - . 199 - .229 - . 185 .013 - . 019 .225 .220 - . 097
.318 .250 . 354 .950 .925 .258 .302 .631
27 27 27 27 27 27 24 27
Variable legend:
LEVELI--segments reported in formal segment reporting divided by lines of business
LEVELII--segments reported in informal segment reporting divided by lines of business
BONDS--amount of debt from public sources divided by total assets
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting the presence of a defined benefit plan
DIRSTK--percentage of stock outstanding held or controlled by officers and directors
DIVINC--dummy variable denoting increases in dividends per share over the sample period
EXCOMP--percentage of executive compensation that is stock-based
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from period 1991 through 1995
PP&E--plant, property and equipment, at cost, divided by total assets
PRVDBT--total liabilities provided by private sources divided by total assets
R&D--expenditures on research and development divided by total assets
STKREP--amount expended to repurchase stock outstanding divided by total assets
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TABLE 21 I concinued)
PP&E PRVDBT R&D STKREP
LEVELI
LEVELII
BONDS
DEFBEN
DIRSTK
DIVINC
EXCOMP
GROWTH
PP&E 1. 000 
27
PRVDBT - . 040 
. 844 
27
1.000
27
R&D - . 024 
. 927 
17
. 177 
.497 
17
1.000
17
STKREP . 029 
.886 
27
- . 361 
. 065 
27
- .068 
. 796 
17
1 . 000 
27
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TABLE 22
Models escimaced co explain Che level of formal segmenc reporcing
across sample firms wichin Che cransporcacion equipmenC manufacCuring induscry
Dependenc variable : LE'/ELI Hypochesized signs below variable names
Bo GROWTH
+
PP&E DEPBEN R&D
♦
n P Adj
R2
M O D E L  1: 
B 
C
sig.
1. 395 
3.504 
. 004
.237
.237
.817
- . 900 
2 . 549 
.025
- .068 
.254 
.804
5.083
1.049
.315
17 2 . 721 . 301
M O D E L  2 : 
B 
C
Sig.
1. 378 
6.085 
.000
- .925 
3.103 
. 008
5 . 672 
1. 342 
.201
17 5 . 818 . 376
M O D E L  3 : 
B 
c
sig.
. 572 
3.130 
.005
1.548 
2.330 
. 029
.238 
1.340 
. 193
27 2.719 . 117
M O D E L  4 : 
B 
C
sig.
. 840 
3 .104 
.005
1.344
1.999
.058
- .355 
1.324 
. 199
.214
1.214
.237
27 2.454 . 144
Variable legend:
LEVELI--segmencs reporced in formal segmenC reporcing divided by lines of business 
DEFBEN--dummy variable denocing exiscence of a defined benefic pension plan 
GROWTH--percencage growch in sales from period 1991 chrough 1995 
PP&E--plane, propercy and equipmenC, ac cosC, divided by cocal assecs 
R&D--expendicures on research and developmenc divided by Cocal assecs
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TABLE 23
Models escimaced Co explain Che level of informal segmenc reporcing
across sample firms wichin Che cransporcacion equipmenc manufaccuring induscry
Dependenc variable: LEVELII Hypochesized signs below variable names
B, GROWTH R&D
+
PP&E
+
DEFBEN a P Adj
R2
MODEL 1: 
B 
C
Sig.
1. 043 
2 . 697 
.018
2.108
2.145
.051
26.691
3.780
.002
-1.055
-2.132
.053
17 11.506 .663
MODEL 2: 
B 
c
sig.
. 944 
1. 512 
. 156
2. 356 
1.505 
. 158
26.280
3.459
.005
-1.012
-1.829
.092
. 088 
.209 
.838
17 8.006 .637
MODEL 3 : 
B 
t
Sig.
1.551
3.402
.002
2. 341 
1. 876 
.073
- . 849 
-1.441 
. 163
27 3 .253 .162
Variable legend:
LEVELII--segmencs reported in informal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting the presence of a defined benefit plan 
GROWTH--percencage growth in sales from period 1991 through 1995 
PP&E--plant, property and equipment, at cost, divided by total assets 
R&D--expenditures on research and development divided by total assets
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TABLE 2 4
Pearson correlations, significance levels and number of observations
for effects considered in hypotheses 1-7 across firms
within the textile mill products manufacturing industry
LEVELI LEVELII BONDS DEFBEN DIRSTK DIVINC EXCOMP GROWTH
LEVELI 1. 000
25
LEVELII .440 1.000
.028
25 25
BONDS .560 .545 1.000
.004 .005
25 25 25
DEPBEN . 199 .129 . 173 1.000
. 340 . 538 . 409
25 25 25 25
DIRSTK - . 099 - .271 - . 378 . 134 1.000
.637 . 190 . 063 .524
25 25 25 25 25
DIVINC . 078 - . 151 - . 346 .035 . 392 1.000
.711 .470 .090 .868 . 053
25 25 25 25 25 25
EXCOMP - . 174 . 058 - .057 . 378 - . 159 - . 044 1.000
.438 .798 .802 . 083 .480 . 845
22 22 22 22 22 22 22
GROWTH - .299 - . 119 - . 391 - . 348 . 165 . 122 - .201 1. 000
. 147 . 570 . 053 . 089 . 431 . 563 . 370
25 25 25 25 25 25 22 25
PP&E .471 .340 .204 .143 . Ill .298 .058 - .095
. 017 .097 . 328 .496 . 598 . 149 .797 .653
25 25 25 25 25 25 22 25
PRVDBT . 132 - . 064 . 380 .112 . 002 - .232 - . 102 - . 243
. 528 . 762 . 061 . 593 . 991 .265 . 651 .242
25 25 25 25 25 25 22 25
R&D
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
STKREP - . 028 - .201 - .236 -.377 - .087 .251 - . 169 . 194
.896 .336 .255 . 063 .678 .227 .452 . 352
25 25 25 25 25 25 22 25
Variable legend;
LEVELI--segments reported in formal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
LEVELII--segments reported in informal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
BONDS--amount of debt from public sources divided by total assecs 
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting the existence of a defined benefit pension plan 
DIRSTK--percentage of stock outstanding held by officers and directors
DIVINC--dummy variable denocing increases in dividends per share over the sample period
EXCOMP--percentage of executive compensation that is stock-based
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from period 1991 through 1995
PP&E--plant, property and equipment, at cost, divided by total assets
PRVDBT--total liabilities provided by private sources divided by total assets
R&D--expenditures on research and development divided by total assets
STKREP--amount expended to repurchase stock outstanding divided by total assets
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TABLE 24 (continued)
PP&E PRVDBT R&D STKREP
LEVEL I
LEVELII
BONDS
DEEBEN
DIRSTK
DIVING
EXCOMP
GROWTH
PP&E 1. 000 
25
PRVDBT - . 376 
. 064 
25
1.000
25
R&D
2 2 2
STKREP - . 363 
. 075 
25
- .249 
.230 
25 2
1.000
25
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TABLE 2 5
Models estimated to explain the level of formal segment reporting
across sample firms within the textile mill products industry
Dependent variable : LEVELI Hypothesized signs below variable names
B, BONDS DEFBEN GROWTH PP&E DIVINC n Adj
+ - + + - F R2
M O D E L  1 :
B . 446 1.460 . 035 - .401 .562 25 . 346
t 1. 985 2 .460 .245 - . 390 2 .160 4 . 172
sig. . 061 . 023 .809 .700 .043
M O D E L  2 :
B .420 1.574 .571 25 . 396
t 2 .440 2 .988 2.300 8 . 881
Sig. . 023 .007 .031
M O D E L  3 :
B . 422 1.826 . 155 25 . 396
t 2.451 3 .118 .987 6.239
sig. . 023 .005 .335
Variable legend:
LEVELI--segments reported in formal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
BONDS--amount of debt from public sources divided by total assets 
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting the existence of a defined benefit pension plan 
DIVING--dummy variable denoting increases in dividends per share over the period 1991 
through 1995
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from period 1991 through 1995 
PP&E--plant, property and equipment, at cost, divided by total assets
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TABLE 26
Models estimated to explain the level of informal segment reporting
across sample firms within the textile mill products industry
Dependent variable: LEVELII Hypothesized signs below variable names
Bo BONDS PP&E DIVINC n Adj
+ ♦ - F R2
MODEL 1:
B . 530 3 . 067 . 817 - . 117 25 .263
t 1. 385 2 . 351 1.353 - .334 3 .854
Sig. . 181 .029 . 190 .741
MODEL 2:
B . 532 3 .255 .736 25 .293
t 1.418 2 . 832 1.359 5 . 966
sig. .170 . 010 . 188
MODEL 3:
B . 992 3 . 574 25 .267
t 6.044 3. 119 9.728
sig. .000 .005
Variable legend:
LEVELII--segments reported in informal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
BONDS--amount of debt from public sources divided by total assets
DIVINC--dummy variable denoting increases in dividends per share over the sample period 
PP&E--plant, property and equipment, at cost, divided by total assets
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TABLE 27
Pearson correlacions, significance levels and number of obser/ations
for effects considered in hypotheses 1-7 across sample firms
within the electrical and electronic machinery, equipment and supplies industry
LEVELI LEVELII BONDS DEFBEN DIRSTK DIVINC EXCOMP GROWTH
LEVELI 1.000
27
LEVELII .286 1. 000
. 149
27 27
BONDS - . 127 - .267 1.000
.527 .179
27 27 27
DEFBEN - .315 . 117 - .253 1.000
. 110 .562 .202
27 27 27 27
DIRSTK - . 296 - . 365 - . 094 - .041 1.000
. 134 . 061 .641 .839
27 27 27 27 27
DIVINC - . 138 .244 - .275 .287 - . 362 1. 000
.493 .219 .165 . 147 . 064
27 27 27 27 27 27
EXCOMP . 083 . 038 - . 048 - .029 - . 019 - . 138 1. 000
. 701 . 860 .824 .894 . 931 .522
24 24 24 24 24 24 24
GROWTH - . 127 - . 322 .210 - .382 .267 - .267 .401 1. 000
. 529 . 101 .293 . 049 . 179 . 179 .052
27 27 27 27 27 27 24 27
PP&E . 161 .245 - . 125 .200 - .202 . 112 . 190 - . 028
.423 .219 . 534 .316 . 312 . 576 . 374 . 891
27 27 27 27 27 27 24 27
PRVDBT - . 090 - .249 - . 060 - .209 .252 - .401 .036 .431
.656 .210 .766 .295 .205 . 038 .869 . 025
27 27 27 27 27 27 24 27
R&D - .074 . 088 .091 . 101 - .430 . 188 .063 - . 421
. 751 . 704 .695 .664 .052 .414 .803 . 057
21 21 21 21 21 21 18 21
STKREP . 185 - . 125 . 009 - . 163 .072 - . 178 - . 248 - . 209
. 355 . 535 . 965 .416 .719 . 375 .243 .296
27 27 27 27 27 27 24 27
Variable legend:
LEVELI--segments reported in formal segment reporting divided by lines of business
LEVELII--segments reported in informal segment reporting divided by lines of business
BONDS--amount of debt from public sources divided by total assets
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting the exostence of a defined benefit pension plan
DIRSTK--percentage of stock outstanding held or controlled by officers and directors
DIVINC--dummy variable denoting increases in dividends per share over the sample period
EXCOMP--percentage of executive compensation that is stock-based
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from period 1991 through 1995
PP&E--plant, property and equipment, at cost, divided by total assets
PRVDBT--total liabilities provided by private sources divided by total assets
R&D--expenditures on research and development divided by total assets
STKREP--amount expended to repurchase stock outstanding divided by total assets
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TABLE 27 (concinued)
PP&E PRVDBT R&D STKREP
LEVELI
LEVELII
BONDS
DEFBEN
DIRSTK
DIVINC
EXCOMP
GROWTH
PP&E 1. 000 
27
PRVDBT - .281 
. 155 
27
1. 000 
27
R&D .183
.427
21
- .081 
.726 
21
1.000
21
STKREP - . 030 
.883 
27
-.395 
. 042 
27
- .219 
.339 
21
1.000
27
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t a b l e  28
Models escimaced to explain the level of formal segment reporting 
across sample firms within the electrical and electronic machinery, 
equipment and supplies manufacturing industry
Dependent variable: LEVELI Hypothesized signs below variable names
Bo DEFBEN DIRSTK GROWTH
+
R&D a
P
Adj
R2
M O D E L  1: 
B 
t
sig.
1.189 
7 . 044 
.000
- . 304 
-2.051 
. 052
- .450 
-1.344 
. 192
- .735 
-1.040 
. 309
27 
2 . 300
.130
M O D E L  2 : 
B 
t
sig.
1.613 
5.898 
. 000
- .408 
-2.303 
. 035
- . 383
- .889 
. 387
-1.892 
-2 .137 
.048
-4.151 
-1.481 
. 158
21 
2 .482
.229
M O D E L  3 : 
B 
t
Sig.
1.555 
5.891 
. 000
- .434 
-2.502 
. 023
-2.148 
-2.581
. 019
-3 .406 
-1.281 
.217
21 
3 . 083
.238
M O D E L  4 : 
B 
t
Sig.
1. 140 
6.803 
. 000
- .318 
-2.112 
.045
- . 993 
-1.436 
. 164
27 
2 .463
. 101
Variable legend:
LEVELI--segments reported in formal segment reporting divided by lines of business 
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting the existence of a defined benefit pension plan 
DIRSTK--percentage of stock outstanding held by officers and directors 
GROWTH--percentage growth in sales from period 1991 through 1995 
R&D--expenditures on research and development divided by total assets
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TABLE 2 9
Models escimaced co explain che level of informal segmenc reporcing 
across sample firms wichin che eleccrical and eleccronic machinery, equipmenc 
and supplies raanufsecuring induscry
Dependenc variable : LEVELII Hypochesized signs below variable names
B, GROWTH
+
BONDS
♦
DIRSTK DEFBEN n
P
Adj
R2
MODEL 1: 
B 
C
sig.
1.736 
7. 185 
.000
-1.289 
- . 912 
.371
-2.491 
-1.402 
. 174
-1.290 
-1.811 
. 083
27 
2 . 583
. 154
MODEL 2 : 
B 
C
sig.
1. 790 
4.681 
. 000
-1.387 
-.902 
. 377
-2.553 
-1.383 
. 180
-1.284
-1.764
.092
- . 060 
- . 185 
.855
27
1.864
. 117
MODEL 3 : 
B 
c
sig.
1.642 
6.935 
. 000
-1.775
-1.269
.217
-1.131 
-1.577 
. 128
27
2.779
. 120
MODEL 4 : 
B 
C
Sig.
1.472 
7.449 
. 000
-1.373 
-1.963 
.061
27 
3 .853
. 099
Variable legend:
LEVELII--segmencs reporced in informal segmenc reporcing divided by lines of business 
BONDS--amounc of debc from public sources divided by cocal assecs 
DEFBEN--dummy variable denocing che exiscence of a defined benefic pension plan 
DIRSTK--percencage of scock oucscanding held or conerolled by officers and direccors 
GROWTH--percencage growch in sales from period 1991 chrough 1995
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TABLE 30
Summary of effects found co have a significant association with the level of segment 
reporting by industry and for all sample firms denoted by X. Correct signs but not
significantly associated denoted by ».
FORMAL SEGMENT REPORTING
BONDS DBF DIR DIV BXC GRO PP&E PRV R&D STK
BEN STK INC OMP WTH DBT REP
FOOD X» X» » » *
MACH » X X X »
CHEM » X» » » • » » '
TRAN • * X» X • »
TEX X» » X» »
ELEC X» » » » X » »
ALL » X» • X» » *
INFORMAL SEGMENT REPORTING
BONDS DBF DIR DIV BXC GRO PP&E PRV R&D STK
BEN STK INC OMP WTH DBT REP
FOOD • • X» »
MACH X» X» » »
CHEM » ' X» • X» • » »
TRAN » ' • X» X X» »
TEX X» ' » » X» » »
ELEC * * • » » »
ALL » X» X» X» • » »
Variable legend:
BONDS--amount of debt from public sources divided by total assets
DEFBEN--dummy variable denoting the existence of a defined benefit pension plan
DIRSTK--percentage of stock outstanding held or controlled by officers and directors
DIVINC--dummy variable denoting increases in dividends per share over the sample period
EXCOMP--percentage of executive compensation that is stock-based
GROWTH--percencage growch in sales from period 1991 through 1995
PP&E--plant, property and equipment, at cost, divided by total assets
PRVDBT--total liabilities provided by private sources divided by total assets
R&D--expenditures on research and development divided by total assets
STKREP--amount expended to repurchase outstanding stock divided by total assets
Industry legend:
FOOD--food and kindred products manufacturing 
MACK--machinery manufacturing
CHEM--chemicals and allied products manufacturing 
TRAN--transportation equipment manufacturing 
TEX--textile mill products manufacturing
ELEC--electrical and electronic machinery, equipment and supplies manufacturing
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